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Firms face a big challenge in matching the supply of perishable goods with 
uncertain demand in real time. In practice, the traditional supply chain models are proved 
not efficiently enough to lower firms’ risk exposure. The purpose of the dissertation is to 
provide the theoretical framework of roles of several stylized markets in firms’ risk 
management. In particular, we explore the influence of the spot business-to-business 
exchange market, forward contract market and credit-default swap market respectively. 
The dissertation is divided into the following three chapters. 
 
In chapter 1, we show that when the exchange market lacks perfect liquidity, a 
firm’s capital structure has a greater influence on its output-level decisions, then the 
market is perfectly liquid. The impact may be even greater than that without an exchange 
market.  This is primarily because the introduction of the exchange market causes firms 





In chapter 2, we study the essential relationship between producers’ forward 
contracts and their supply strategies in business-to-business exchange market. 
Specifically, we focus on the application of the electricity power exchange market in the 
US. Our model reveals that the strategic incentive makes producers to join in forward 
contract market voluntarily and increases social welfare.  
 
We show in chapter 1 that even when firms’ risks are independent of each other, 
there is a chance that the realization of market uncertainty turns out to be the same. As a 
result, there is no exchange market as a platform to help firms hedge their risks.  
Therefore, we need other instruments in firms’ risk management portfolio. In chapter 3, 
we propose a financial market, credit-default swap market, in which firms can 
temporarily transfer default risks to outside investors. However, the “lemon” problem 
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Chapter 1. Capital Structure, Demand Uncertainty and the B2B 
Exchange Market 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In this paper, we analyze a new type of risk-hedging vehicle, a business-to-business 
(B2B) exchange market, and its effect on a firm's capital structure dependency. 
Operations management researchers generally ignore the influence of capital structure 
following Modigliani-Miller (1958) irrelevance propositions, which state that a firm's 
market valuation is independent of its financing and dividend pay-out decisions. 
Therefore, the propositions conclude, a firm can separate its financial and operational 
decisions. However, the propositions require strong assumptions that generally are not 
satisfied. Economics and corporate finance researchers have shown that a firm’s capital 
structure affects its production decisions and hence its market valuation (Titman 1984; 
Brander and Lewis 1986). Recognizing this impact is particularly important to a firm’s 
shareholders, managers, and competitors who seek to predict the firm’s operation 
decisions and determine its value. 
Despite these theoretical results, many firms still separate their financial and 
production department decision processes (Wanzenried 2003). Researchers argue that the 
effect of capital structure is less powerful when the firm can better hedge its operational 
risks. (Froot et al 1993; Spano 2002). Financial engineering has made available a variety 
of risk-hedging vehicles for public trading, creating unprecedented opportunities for 
firms to hedge various operational risks.1 Although capital structure concerns seem less 
relevant in this better "insured" world, the precise nature of the relationship deserves 
more careful study.  
 
In a risk-hedging market, firms essentially buy or sell contingency contracts 
according to their own risk-hedging requirements. Firms that take opposite positions can 
effectively form a risk-sharing pool. However, researchers have noted that those hedging 
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markets often fail to attract enough traders ( Borio 2003; Moorthy 2003; Scobie 2003f). 
This lack of liquidity may result in increased risk-hedging and strategic interaction costs. 
In this paper, we show that lack of participation may make a firm’s operational decisions 
even more dependent on its capital structure. We justify this possibility by analyzing a 
group of limited-liability manufacturing firms with certain debt levels and uncertain 
future customer demand.  
 
We choose to study the business-to-business exchange market in this paper (our 
choice of hedging market is an effective example, but not the only one2). B2B exchange 
markets have grown in popularity with the development of the Internet. An exchange 
market provides a firm the platform to sell its excess production or supply for its unmet 
demand, alleviating its demand risk. As in most trading markets, the B2B market price is 
set to balance supply and demand. An outstanding example of a B2B exchange market is 
the cooperative electricity exchange in the power pool, such as in California (Wilson 
2003) and Great Britain (Newbery 1992). 
A firm’s capital structure, especially its debt-to-equity ratio, may be set for a variety 
of reasons. Jensen and Meckling (1976) are among the first to demonstrate that an 
appropriate debt-to-equity ratio helps firms reduce agency costs. Hart (1993) summarizes 
the role of debt as a managerial discipline device. For example, it can force liquidation 
and prevent empire building. In addition, a firm’s capital structure can signal its 
profitability to outside investors (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Brander and Lewis (1986) 
found that debt could also serve as a commitment to competition in a duopoly market. 
We choose to study the effect of a firm’s debt on its operational decisions, rather than 
explain the reasons for its established capital structure, while our simulation results 
provide evidence that the optimal capital structure exists. Hence, we assume firms’ debt 
levels are exogenous variables.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 These hedging platforms include B2B markets, forward markets, VoXs, event derivatives, and others. 
2 Shin (2004) showed that the relationship between two traders in a financial market lacking liquidity is 
mostly comprised of strategic substitutes. 
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The influence of capital structure varies according to different liquidation policies. 
Firms that adopt limited liability are most often studied. Under a limited-liability 
structure, the firm is controlled by equity holders unless it fails to pay back its contracted 
debt and claims bankruptcy. If that happens, control shifts to debt-holders. We assume 
the same liquidation policy to analyze the firm’s strategic decisions in the exchange 
market. We show how hedging-market liquidity affects a firm’s dependency on its capital 
structure. Other capital structures and liquidation policies may lead to different results. 
We suggest that investors should carefully monitor firms’ outstanding debt levels. 
  
This paper is the first to study the effect of hedging-market liquidity on firms’ capital 
structures and operational decisions. We show that the use of a hedging market may not 
necessarily unbind firms’ operational and financial decisions. Hedging-market liquidity 
plays an important role in this issue. On the surface, the increasing availability of new 
hedging tools creates more hedging opportunities for firms and thus more financial 
market prosperity. However, researchers have expressed concern over how liquidity 
vanishes as the market grows (Borio 2003). On one hand, the wider choice of hedging 
vehicles increases the complexity of identifying the best one. On the other, it increases 
market frictions, such as transaction costs, thereby diminishing pricing efficiency. Our 
research justifies the critical role of hedging-market liquidity in correctly determining 
firm value. 
 
Our model includes multiple local monopolies facing idiosyncratic market demand 
risks. Each monopoly produces a homogenous, short-lived product and bears a certain 
level of debt. All the firms adopt a limited-liability structure. The exchange market opens 
after the firms determine production levels, but before they resolve local demand 
uncertainties.  
 
We begin with a model in which no exchange market exists. A firm’s production 
level may increase as it bears more debt, which is consistent with the results predicted in 
most limited-liability literature (Brander and Lewis 1986; Showalter 1995; Wanzenried 
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2003). We then investigate two models in which firms can trade in the exchange market. 
The only difference between them is the total number of participating firms (O’Hara 
1995; Kyle 1989).  
 
In the first model, there are an infinite number of identical firms. Each firm’s trading 
volume is small compared to the total market size. In this extreme case, the market-
clearing price almost certainly converges to the marginal cost of production. Each firm 
produces to maximize overall firm value, but the debt level does not affect production. 
Therefore, a fully liquid market is introduced and the equilibrium is consistent with the 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) irrelevance propositions. 
 
Departing from the fully liquid market, our second model contains only two firms. 
Although the two-firm model is another extreme case, it captures a firm’s strategic 
decisions when observing the other firm’s outstanding debt. It also maintains theoretical 
simplicity and flexibility. The lack of liquidity in this model induces firms’ to adjust their 
exchange market prices. This strategic incentive is affected by the firm’s debt level, 
leading capital structure to become more influential. Most importantly, we quantitatively 
show that the affect of capital structure on firms’ incentives to adjust market price may 
dominate the decreasing impact of the capital structure from hedging. This leads to an 
even stronger aggregate impact than in the case without the exchange market. We also 
find that production levels are lower in the exchange-market model because the exchange 
market guarantees more efficient use of the aggregate production. In addition, the firm’s 
production rises with its own debt, but falls as the other firm holds more debt.  
 
We conducted simulations to analyze firms’ equilibrium strategies under a variety of 
debt levels. Our results suggest that the firm with significantly less debt can take 
advantage of its counterpart’s high leverage, and save costs by lowering (or even ceasing) 
production. This is because the high-debt firm will produce more aggressively. The 
exchange market can allow the low-debt firm to save on operational costs and reduce its 
financial risk. The high-debt firm, in contrast, cannot get help from its counterpart if it 
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has a shortage. It must insure itself by increasing production. In the extreme case -- in 
which one firm bears enormous debt and the other has none -- the exchange market’s 
impact is significant: The full-equity firm can nearly stop producing and rely on the other 
firm’s excess production.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model 
and present our argument and major findings. In Section 3, we discuss possible 
extensions to and limitations of our model. We summarize and conclude in Section 4.  
2. MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
2.1 No Exchange Market 
Consider N identical firms that are monopolies in their local markets. The firms 
produce homogenous, short-lived goods at a constant marginal cost, 0c  , and sell them 
at a uniform price, P c . For firm  1,2, ,i I N   , its local market demand, iQ , is 
uncertain when it determines its production level, iq . The firm’s operational profit 
function is 
      ; , , min ,      1,...,i i i i i iq Q P c P q Q cq i N         (1) 
Prior to realization, iQ is regarded as an independent random variable drawn from a 
common distribution function, ( )F   with support  0, . This means that the local 
markets are isolated from each other. We assume that F  is twice differentiable and 
strictly concave.  
 
In terms of capital structure, we assume the firms are controlled by equity-holders 
who adopt the limited-liability corporate structure. Each firm has outstanding debt, which 
we denote the face value as Bi for firm i. The debt holders will seize control of the 
company if the equity holder fails to pay back Bi after selling the products.   
 
Without an exchange market, each firm makes production decisions based on its local 
market demand. We can hence analyze each firm separately. The firm i equity-holder’s 
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max  E ( ) ( ( ; , , ) ) ( )
i
i i i i i i iq
B q P c Q B f Q dQ 
 

          1,...,i N   (2) 
Lemma 13: Firm i is bankrupt when: 
1. iq  i
B
P c
; or  
2. iq  i
B
P c




Note that ( ( ; , , ) )i i i iq P c Q B   is either positive or zero. Lemma 1 implies that the firm 
can expect a strictly positive profit when producing more than iB
P c
. We can thus regard 
iB
P c
 as the lower bound of the firm’s production. It increases with the firm’s debt level. 
According to Lemma 1, we can rewrite the equity-holder’s optimization problem as 





i i i i i i i i i i i iB Q qq
P c




           
 1,...,i N   (3) 
In order to rule out extreme equilibrium cases such as zero or infinite production 




1 , which 
guarantees that the debt is not impossible to repay. Hence, the firms will be willing to 





  is non-decreasing in x4. This ensures that 
the probability of extremely high demand decreases fast enough to keep production from 
reaching infinity.5 Denote NOiq  as the optimal production level for firm i when there is no 
exchange market. Proposition 1 characterizes NOiq . 
                                                 
3 All proofs are listed in the Appendix. 
4  T x  represents the rate of decreasing likelihood. 
5 If  f x  does not decrease fast enough, the firm is so secure in limited liability that it always produces an 
infinite amount seeking huge profit. For example   2
1f x
x
  for  1,x  . The first order condition will not 
equal zero unless x   . 
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Proposition 1 enables us to discuss the affect of debt levels on the operational decisions 
of limited-liability firms and compare that affect to other cases. This impact is 
summarized in Proposition 2. 








0 .  
Proposition 2 shows that, in equilibrium, firm i increases production as it bears more 
debt. Denoting the optimal solutions for cases with and without limited liability as NOq  
and NLq , respectively, yields Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. NO NLq q  
The first order derivative of (3) can be written as  
    ˆ1 i iP F q c cF Q        (4) 
The part in parentheses is identical to the one in the case without limited liability. The 
extra term in (3.4),  ˆicF Q , represents the impact of limited liability when the firm 
includes a positive debt level in its capital structure. Since  ˆicF Q  is strictly positive, we 
conclude that the limited-liability firm will choose a higher production level. We call this 
over-production the “limited liability effect.”  
2.2 Exchange Market with Multiple Firms 
The exchange market opens at time 1. After the demand is realized, each firm 
simultaneously submits its trade plan. Without knowing the realization of demand for 
other firms each firm’s quantity to exchange is | |i iq Q . The market-clearing price, w, is 
decided by the total supply and demand in the market. The model is divided into three 
periods (see Figure 1): At time 0, firms’ debt levels are set; at time 1, firms choose their 
production levels before they observe their local demand; at time 2, when the local 
demand is realized, the firms decide how to trade to maximize profit and then repay debt.  
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Figure 1: Timeline 
 
We first consider an ideal case that includes a very large number of identical firms. 
As a result, each firm’s production has a negligible impact on the market price. The Law 





lim .     (5) 
Since the firms bear identical debt ex ante, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium. 
We suppress the subscript i for each firm and use superscript FL to denote the case with a 
large number of market participants. The equilibrium is summarized in Proposition 3.  
Proposition 3: When N ,  
1. the market clearing price w = c; 
2. the equilibrium production is FLq EQ ;  
3. and / 0FLq B   . 
 
Proposition 3 shows that the market-clearing price is equal to the marginal cost of 
production. In addition, each firm’s production level is the same as the expected demand 
in the equilibrium. Because of the stability of the average market demand, the firms can 
fully hedge their market risks. The market-clearing price will not deviate from the 
marginal cost so to avoid over-supply or shortage. The critical assumption is that each 
firm’s trading volume is tiny compared to the total market size. No one firm expects to 
affect the market price, w, through its own order and, therefore, the exchange market 
achieves full liquidity. Number 3 of Proposition 3 shows that a firm’s debt has no impact 
on its production choice; production and financial decisions are unbundled in a fully 
liquid market.  
 
Firms simultaneously 
determine production levels 
Debt levels  
are given.  
Firms trade in the 
exchange market 
Firms observe  
their local demands  
Time 0           Time 1                  Time 2  
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This model depends on the assumption of an infinite number of small firms. 
However, no actual B2B exchange market satisfies this condition. In the next section, we 
determine if the production and financial decisions will still be separated in a market that 
is not fully liquid.  
2.3 Exchange Market with Two Firms 
In this section, we study a case where there is insufficient liquidity in the exchange 
market. We keep the same model setup, except that N =2, to maintain comparability. We 
denote the two firms as i and j. The firms’ strategies are captured by their production 
decisions, ( , )i jq q . We solve the equilibrium strategy, * *( , )i jq q , by backward induction. 
2.3.1 The Exchange Market and Market-Clearing Price, w. 
One of six cases is possible after the firms make production decisions and realize the 
demand in their local market. These cases are summarized in Table 1: 
Table 1. The Cases after Demand Realization 
Case 1 0i i j jQ q q Q     
Case 2 0 iijj qQQq  
Case 3 0 QqqQ ijj  
Case 4 0 jjii qQQq  
Case 5 0 ii qQ &   0 jj qQ  
Case 6 0 ii qQ  &  0 jj qQ  
 
The two firms only exchange if one has excess products and the other has a shortage 
(Cases 1 through 4). The trade is not possible if both firms have excess or shortage 
simultaneously (Cases 5 and 6). Therefore, the firms’ operational risks are not fully 
hedged.  
In Cases 1 through 4, the exchange demand, ( )D w , for the buying firm, i (without 





















       








  2,1i   (6) 
Since the firm has local shortage, it wants to buy as much as possible when the price 
is lower than P. However, when the market-clearing price is P, the firm is indifferent 
toward buying. The firm will stop buying when the price rises above P. The selling firm’s 
supply function is 























 1,2j     (7) 
The firm is willing to sell at any positive price because it already paid the cost of 
production. There is no extra local demand and selling on the exchange market is the only 
way to earn extra money. The firm is indifferent toward selling when the market-clearing 

















    2,1,  ji  (8) 
A simple calculation shows that   






Lemma 3 illustrates that in the two-firm model, the market-clearing price is influenced by 
the firms’ production strategies ( , )i jq q .  The expected market-clearing price, WE ji QQ , , is 
)Pr(, jijiQQ qqQQPWE ji     (9) 
Given firms’ local demands ),( ji QQ , firm i expects that market-clearing price decreases 
with the production level, since the increase in the production lowers the chance of the 
market price being high.  As a result, the exchange market is not fully liquid. 
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2.3.2 The Equilibrium Production Strategies. 
We now determine the firms’ production decisions in period 1. A firm selects a 
production level to maximize its equity-holders’ expected profits. Decision-makers know 
that the profit is contingent on the other firm’s production decision and the possible 
realization of demand in both local markets. Depending on range that the optimal solution 










i i j i i
iq
i
i i j i i
BG q q B q
P cMax G
BG q q B q
P c
   
 
 
    (10) 
Denoting the probability of bankruptcy in the cases with and without the exchange 
market as ( , )i jQ Q  and ( )iF Q , respectively, yields 
Lemma 4: ( , ) ( )i j iQ Q F Q    
(10) implies that a firm working within an exchange market may still expect a strictly 
positive profit, even if it produces less than iq  i
B
P c
. This is because the firm can expect 
to buy products from the other firm if the latter has less demand. However, Lemma 1 
shows that, without the exchange market, a firm always goes bankrupt when it produces 
less than iB
P c
. The Lemma 4 also shows that a firm working inside the exchange market 




Lemma 4 indicates that the exchange market lets firms pool their demand risks and 
effectively reduce their operational risks. In fact, when the two firms are totally isolated, 
their probability of going bankrupt depends only on the actual local demand after they set 
up their production plans. Exchange markets give firms a channel to improve their profits 
after they know their local demands. The two firms help each deal with demand 
uncertainty through this channel.   
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2.3.3 The Numerical Analysis 
We next determine the optimal production level for each firm. Unfortunately, the 
objective function is complex and non-linear; its properties can be analyzed only for an 
explicit distribution. Consider the exponential distribution. The demand distribution is 
now represented as iQi eQf
 )( ;  1,2i  . The exponential distribution follows the 





.  1,2i  , which guarantees both that the expected demand is not too low and 
that the probability of demand will not fade out too quickly.  
 
2.3.3.1 Symmetric Case 
In this section, we only consider the optimal solution: When the two firms have debt 
with identical face values. BBB ji  . We are only interested in symmetric, sub-game, 
perfect equilibrium ( EX EX EXi jq q q  ) here.  
Lemma 5: If there exists a symmetric equilibrium such that EX EX EXi jq q q  , then 
EXq  B
P c
 must hold.  
The two firms cannot simultaneously choose production levels lower than B
P c
 in the 
equilibrium.  This is because a firm will only scale back production if it knows that the 
other firm will produce enough for both of them. Since Lemma 3 rules out the existence 
of a symmetric equilibrium in Case 1, we focus only on Case 2.  The first order derivative 
from Case 2 is 
   
 
2( ) 2 2
2
ˆ
1( ) 1 ( )
2





i j i j i i j
q q Q
i i
Pe q q q q q q q c









         
          
  (11)   
Proposition 4: The optimal production EXq  uniquely exists.  
 (11) shows the existence of equilibrium. In addition, if we denote that NLq is the optimal 




Lemma 6: EXq  is greater than NLq . 
As with Lemma 2, we can prove that the first two terms of (11) are identical to the first-
order derivative of the profit maximization problem in the case without limited liability. 
Therefore, the last two terms of (11) represent the limited-liability effect. Since the sum 
of the last two terms is always positive -- even when the firms can exchange in the 
market -- the limited-liability effect still leads to over-production.  
 
Although Proposition 4 presents the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution 
under a general condition, it is still unlikely that we can derive a closed-form solution. 
This is because the functional forms of the objective function and the first-order 
condition are complex. But, a general analytical solution is unnecessary because we seek 
only to justify the possibility that the influence of a firm’s capital structure on its 
operational decisions is strengthened when its operational risks are reduced. Rather than 
performing a complicated mathematical proof in the next section, we use the simulation 
to show the comparative static analysis results.  
 
We next compare the equilibrium of the current model to the one without an 
exchange market. Our goal is to show the change in both equilibrium production and the 
effect of the capital structure in an illiquid exchange market (P = 1 through 100). The 




 in order 
to follow the assumption in the model6. We present simulation results and numerical 



















  1, 2for i   
Table 2.The Effect of the Firm’s Own Debt 
                                                 
6 We randomly chose 500 groups of parameters for this simulation. 
7 The numerical example uses the exponential distribution with 0.5  and cP 2 . Authors will provide 
other simulation results by request. 
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Without Exchange Market With Exchange Market  
1B   2B   3B   4B   5B   1B   2B   3B   4B   5B   
10P   0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.302 0.315 0.324 0.339 0.355 
20P   0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.148 0.151 0.154 0.157 0.161 
30P   0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.098 0.099 0.101 0.102 0.103 
40P   0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.076 
50P   0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.060 
 
Result 1 shows that the effect of debt on production is still positive with an exchange 
market. Production increases when the firm has more debt. More importantly, the results 
show that the debt effect is of greater magnitude in the exchange case. This is the core 
argument in this paper: Even if firms can reduce their risks through an exchange market, 
the effect of debt is likely higher than when there is no exchange market.  
 
In equilibrium, firms’ production levels are the result of their strategic interactions. 
We summarize the effect of the opponent’s debt on a firm’s production decisions in 










  for i j  
Table 3.The Effect of the Other Firm’s Debt 
 1B   2B   3B   4B   5B   
10P   -0.185 -0.197 -0.207 -0.221 -0.237 
20P   -0.090 -0.093 -0.096 -0.099 -0.102 
30P   -0.059 -0.060 -0.061 -0.063 -0.064 
40P   -0.044 -0.045 -0.045 -0.046 -0.047 




Result 2 and Table 3 show that one firm’s optimal production level is negatively 
correlated with the other firm’s debt. In other words, the higher one firm’s debt, the less 
the other produces.  
 
According to Results 1 and 2, the firm’s debt affects both its and its counterpart’s 
production. Hence, when the market lacks full liquidity, the firms can strategically affect 
each other’s production decisions. The optimal output level from Result 3 and Table 4 is 
the equilibrium of the strategic interaction between both firms. 
 
Result 3: NO EXq q  1,2for i  . 
Table 4.The Optimal Production 
Without Exchange Market With Exchange Market  
1B   2B   3B   4B   5B   1B   2B   3B   4B   5B   
10P   2.97 3.17 3.37 3.57 3.77 2.70 2.82 2.93 3.05 3.17 
20P   2.87 2.97 3.07 3.17 3.27 2.64 2.70 2.76 2.82 2.88 
30P   2.84 2.90 2.97 3.03 3.10 2.62 2.66 2.70 2.74 2.78 
40P   2.82 2.87 2.92 2.97 3.02 2.61 2.64 2.67 2.70 2.73 
50P   2.81 2.85 2.89 2.93 2.97 2.61 2.63 2.65 2.68 2.70 
 
The equilibrium output is lower when the firms operate in an exchange market. On 
one hand, firm i knows that its production should be higher than the lower bound in order 
to cover its debt obligation. Firm i’s debt has the same positive impact on its production 
as it has in the model with no exchange market (limited-liability effect). However, when 
the exchange market opens, Firm i’s debt has a negative effect on firm j. The more debt 
firm i holds, the less firm j produces. (12) shows that firm i’s marginal profit decreases as 
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(12) 
This result is because the expected market-clearing price increases as firm j’s 
production drops. Firm i benefits from increasing production because it may have a better 
chance to sell its excess at price P. Overall, identical debt levels induce even higher 
production when the exchange market exists. At the same time, firm j’s debt obligation 
has a negative effect on firm i’s production decision. firm j has  to produce enough to 
cover its identical debt level. Since the market lacks perfect liquidity, the rise in firm j’s 
production increases the chance for firm i to buy excess products at low prices, which, in 
turn, leads to a decrease in firm i’s production. As a result, firm i is less motivated to plan 
a very high level of production. The equilibrium output level is eventually the balance of 
these two forces.    
 
2.3.3.2 THE ASYMMETRIC CASE  
We assume that the two firms have different capital structures and ji BB    for i j .  
In Figure 2, we compare the equilibrium between the symmetric case and the asymmetric 
case (in which we assume 2i jB B ). 
Figure 2. The Best Response of Two Firms 
(Left graph: 50,50  ji BB . Right graph: 25,50  ji BB ) 
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According to Figure 2: 
Result 4: If i jB B , then * *i jq q . 
Table 5.The Optimal Output (P=100) 
 10iB   20iB   30iB   40iB   50iB   
iq  2.79 3.08 3.36 3.63 3.88  
/ 2j iB B  jq  2.55 2.35 2.14 1.92 1.70 
 
The observation from Table 5 follows the same logic as in the symmetric case. When 
one firm has more financial obligation than the other, it should maintain a higher level of 
production. As the low-leveraged firm takes advantage of its counterpart’s high 
production commitment its own production approaches its lower boundary. 
 




  because both 
firms have the same ex ante obligation and so should behave the same way. This 
conclusion may not be true in the asymmetric case. Consider a case in which one firm has 
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zero debt and the other firm bears a very high level of debt ( 0, 0i jB B  ). The full-
equity firm has the least incentive to produce. Hence, the debt-laden firm predicts that it 
will get little help fulfilling any shortage from the exchange. Meanwhile, there is a fairly 
good chance for the debt-laden firm to profit from the exchange market when the full-
equity firm’s local demand turns out to be high.  Therefore, two forces drive the debt-
laden firm to produce at a much higher level. Figure 3 shows that when a debt-laden firm 
produces aggressively while the optimal solution for the full-equity firm is close to zero.   
Figure 3. The Best Response 
( 99, 0i jB B  ) 
 
 
In this situation, the debt-laden firm commits to very high production in order to pay 
back its debt. Since the full-equity firm has a zero lower bound for production, it can 
simply shut down its machines and purchase from the other firm.  Table 6 presents the 
simulation results for the effect of debt on the debt-laden firm. When the two firms have 
different capital structures, the table shows that the effect of the firm’s debt on its 
production decision is still larger than in the case with the exchange market. 
Table 6. The Effect of the Debt 
 
19  
With Exchange Market Without Exchange Market 
0.0190 0.0177 
3 DISCUSSION AND EXTENSION 
3.1 Choice of Risk-Hedging Vehicles 
We choose to study a firm with a B2B exchange market hedging vehicle. A B2B 
exchange market effectively hedges demand uncertainty because it is flexible enough to 
absorb hedging volumes. As a result, it is used in industries with high demand volatility. 
However, when there are insufficient participants in the market, each one can affect the 
market price and other participants’ payoffs. Borio (2003) named these “counterparty 
risks” and documented the exaberance of them in derivative markets. He also argues that 
counterparty risks are one of the major factors leading to market crises.  
 
In our model, the firms strategically determine their production levels in an effort to 
affect the price in an insufficiently liquid market. According to Borio, this behavior is one 
source of counterparty risks. We extend Borio’s argument by showing that this strategic 
behavior makes firms more vulnerable to their capital structures.  
 
One may argue that firms can simply choose other hedging vehicles to avoid 
counterparty risks. For example, firms could agree to a fixed exchange price ex ante. 
However, this is generally not possible in a demand uncertainty model in which firms’ 
production and local demand levels are private information (Oum, Oren, Deng 2005). 
Hence, an ex ante contract cannot explicitly describe when the firms should exchange. 
The contract literature, though unfinished, predicts that ex post renegotiation due to an 
incomplete contract may lead to an inefficient outcome.  
 
Alternate hedging vehicles, such as options or futures, require that firms commit to 
certain hedging volumes (e.g. purchase a fixed number of call options). But, that type of 
hedging may not be fully efficient when demand is extremely volatile. In addition, 
counterparty risks may also exist in the derivative market (Borio 2003). 
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3.2 Number of firms and market liquidity 
The exchange market effectively reduces firms’ profit volatility by pooling their risks. 
Lack of liquidity in the market may cause strategic interaction among firms and 
strengthen the affect of their capital structures on their production decisions. Hedging is 
effective only with a sufficient number of market participants, so that firms can reduce 
their operational risks to the largest extent and be the least restricted by their capital 
structures. However, although the law of large number is effectively used in all kind of 
research works, we know that a world with infinite number of firms does not exist in 
general cases. 
 
With limited number of firms in the market, there is  a chance that the realization of 
firms demand turns out to be the same, i.e. all firms have excess supply or shortage, even 
if firms have idiosyncratic demand risks.  As a result, the market fails, because of severe 
illiquidity. In traditional economic or financial researches, this “macro”-like shock is 
usually caused by a perfectly correlated risk faced by all firms in ex-post market 
(Persaud, 2003). However in this paper , we have showed that even with idiosyncratic 
shocks, this could happen8, and the chance could be large especially when we deviate 
from the conventional assumption of fat tail distribution of demand risk and consider 
extreme events as ancillaries (Taleb 2001).  Therefore, in their risk management decision, 
firms need some other hedging vehicles which and insure firms when this “macro” shock 
appears. 
 
3.3 Correlated demand 
Our analysis focuses on firms’ idiosyncratic demand risks. We show that liquidity 
depends on the number of market traders. However, liquidity can also be affected by the 
diversity of hedging demand (Persaud 2001). When demand risks are negatively 
                                                 




correlated,9 the exchange market can clearly help the hedging counterparties and hence 
improve market liquidity. In this case, we predict a firm’s capital structure would be less 
influential and the problems discussed in this paper would become less severe. The ideal 
Modigliani-Miller world is obtained when the risks are perfectly negatively correlated 
(the correlation is -1). However, finding a hedging counterparty with a negatively 
correlated risk is generally difficult – if not impossible.  
 
Firms’ operational risks are usually positively correlated due to some macro event. 
The war in Iraq affects gas prices, for example, or an economic downturn slows 
consumer spending. The exchange market appears to be less capable of hedging risks 
such as these. However, if the firms receive differential predictions about forthcoming 
risks, the exchange market price can reflect the aggregate prediction and help the firms 
better prepare. Guo et al (2005) explored the possibility of constructing a macro 
prediction market and theoretically justified the potential efficiency gain. 
 
In addition, even if the exchange market maintains adequate liquidity it could cause 
firms to care less about their capital structures. For example, firms may maintain a high 
debt-to-equity ratio to increase the return per share. As a result, they become vulnerable 
to macro-level shocks, which may eventually lead to financial market crises. 
3.4 Bankruptcy Cost 
The limited-liability effect is an important issue in the literature (Brander & Lewis 
1986; Wanzenried 2003). The limited-liability structure assumes no bankruptcy costs and 
may lead firms to take risks. For the simplicity of mathematical illustration, we consider 
it an example of the possible influence of capital structure. In practice, a bankruptcy 
imposes extra costs such as financial distress, inefficient liquidation, and managerial 
reputation loss. It is reasonable to predict that these costs may induce firms to follow a 
more conservative output strategy. However, the major result of our analysis stands: Debt 
                                                 
9 For example, the demand peaks for electricity in the Northern and Southern United States arrive in Winter 
and Summer, respectively. 
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levels influence firms’ production decisions and the influence may get stronger when the 
exchange market lacks liquidity.  
 
3.5 Multi-Period Strategies. 
We opened our paper with a one-period analysis to show the possible influence of 
exchange market liquidity. We assumed the product was short-lived and the firm’s debt 
matured at the end of the period. In this case, firms use the exchange market to maximize 
end-of-period cash flow by either selling excess products or buying products to meet 
demand. One possible extension of this work is to look at storable goods associated with 
long-term debt. If the goods are storable, the firms can hold inventory for future periods, 
leading to less desire to trade in the exchange market. However, the firm will still want to 
sell if the inventory costs are high enough. In that case, our model and results hold. The 
firms’ exchange plans are a trade-off between the benefit from holding inventory and the 
profit to be gained in the exchange market.  
 
Future research should address firms with low inventory costs but differing debt-
maturity dates. Firms with long-term debt may take advantage of those that have debts 
closer to maturity. We expect that the capital structure in an illiquid exchange market 
would be more influential under these circumstances.  
4 CONCLUSION 
We studied how firms’ capital structures affect their production decisions in a 
business-to-business exchange market. Our example shows how the market can increase 
a capital structure’s influence on production, even as it reduces the firm’s operational 
risk. Firms behave strategically in an exchange market that lacks perfect liquidity. In a 
two-firm model, a firm’s debt has positive effect on its own production decision and a 
negative effect on its counterpart’s. Under certain circumstances, the positive effect is so 
powerful that the influence of capital structure becomes stronger than it would be without 




We expect that our model can be applied to a variety of industries.  One of the best 
prospects is the wholesale electricity market (Stoft 2002). In all de-regulated US 
electricity markets an individual utility serves its own demand (bilateral contracts) while 
simultaneously bidding in the balancing energy market. Although market designs may 
vary, the energy market lets firms buy or sell energy which helps them increase 
operational flexibility and serve the real-time load.  Future researchers should look at the 
influence of financial decisions on a firm’s production behaviors, especially for investor-
owned utilities. Our paper addresses the importance of exchange market liquidity. As 
more risk-hedging vehicles become available, we call managerial attention to the 
essential relationship between capital structure and production. 
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Chapter 2. Forward Contracting, Supply Function Equilibrium, and 
Market Efficiency 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The non-storable characteristic of perishable goods makes unilateral withholding of 
production profitable. Hence, mitigation of market power is a big issue in the exchange 
market of perishable goods. It is widely acknowledgeable that that long-term contract 
arrangement serves an efficient vehicle to improve market efficiency10. However, the 
vision cannot be taken for granted. Mitigating market power in perishable goods 
exchange market calls for carefully studying the motivation and consequence of long-
term contracting. An important question is whether the firms with perishable goods, have 
incentive to sign long-term contract voluntarily, rather than compulsorily. 
 
This paper is inspired by the electricity market exchange. Over the past decade or 
more, most electricity markets in US have been in the process of restructuring. The goal 
of this restructuring emphasizes the introduction of competition into markets where 
competition will benefit ratepayers, the use of performance-based incentive regulation in 
areas that are not competitive, and the development of efficient prices based on marginal 
costs for regulated rates. However, the current electricity market is not always 
competitive. The price significantly departs from the competitive level, i.e. marginal cost, 
especially during peak time. The market power is common, even in the area of low 
market concentration. It is mostly because of the unique characteristics of electricity 
itself, and its demand and supply. Since electricity is a non-storable good, the producers’ 
ability to exercise market power can not be smoothed by inventory management. The 
problem is even exacerbated because the demand of electricity is very inelastic and the 
supply is constrained by producers’ available capacities. 
 
                                                 




A considerable amount of empirical researches provide evidence of the existence of 
market power in US power market. Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B., and Wolak, F. A. 
(2002) study California market during June 1998 to October 2000, and conclude that the 
59% of increase in electricity expenditure was attributable to increased market power.  
Wolak, F. (2003) measures the five largest electricity suppliers in the California who had 
to exercise market power in the state's wholesale market almost in the same periods. The 
estimation results present the enormous increase in the amount market power exercised in 
the California market.  Hortacsu and Puller (2005) examine producers’ bidding behaviors 
in the balancing energy market in Texas. They show that single producer’s bidding 
strategy can influence the distribution of market clearing price. Taking this influence into 
account, they show that the producers’ bidding schedules significantly depart from the 
competitive one.  
 
In order to alleviate the market power problem, many market designers try to modify 
the regulation policy to allow the forward trading. For instance, Wolak, F. (2001), 
Chairman of Market Surveillance Committee (MSC) of the California Independent 
System Operator (ISO) proposed a comprehensive market power mitigation plan, which 
impose that “any market participant that does not offer these two-year forward contracts 
would lose its market-based rate authority and be subject to cost-of-service rates for all of 
its sales of energy and ancillary services into the California market and surrounding 
markets in the Western US for at least this two-year period.” (Wolak, F. 2001). Bushnell, 
Mansur and Saravia (2004) compare market equilibrium outcomes in California, New 
England, and PJM electricity market. Their estimation shows that the equilibrium price 
falls dramatically in New England and PJM market, when they include the forward 
contract between producers and retails in the objective function. Meanwhile, the price in 
California market keeps high because producers can not be allowed to sign forward 
contract with retails. However, the equilibriums become similar in all the markets after 




In earlier literature, the motivation of long-term contracting often rests on the desire 
of hedging price or cost uncertainties by risk-averse firms. However, more recently, a 
number of studies show that strategic benefit in competition is sufficient even for risk-
neutral firms to engaging long-term contracting. Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila(1993) 
are among the first to study the impact of forward contracting on oligopoly competition. 
They illustrates that firms can take up better position in competition through strategic 
forward. Willems (2005) use the similar framework as Allaz and Vila (1993) to show that 
the future market increases the market efficiency in Cournot competition.  
 
In this paper, our research rules out the hedge-orientated incentive of long-term 
contracting. We assume that a group of risk-neutral producers interact in two consequent 
stages: forward contract stage and spot exchange market. Before the real time demand is 
realized, producers can sell forward contracts to retailers in the contract stage. In real 
time, the producers involve a uniform multi-unit auction in the spot market, with the 
structure similar to that in Wilson (1979). The producers submit supply functions, 
specifying the correspondent between all prices and quantities which they would like to 
offered ex-post.  
 
Although Cournot game setting is useful to analyze the effect of forward contract in 
the literature, it is not the best structure to describe firms’ supply strategies of perishable 
goods with high demand uncertainty in the exchange market (Baldick, Grant and Kahn, 
2004). In Cournot setting, producers’ strategy is to choose a fixed quantity ex-ante. 
However, it is not optimal for producers to commit to a simple or fixed quantity in a 
market with high demand risk. Instead, the supply functions (or supply schedules), which 
contain the quantity they want to provide at each level of price, allow producers’ 
operation to be optimal corresponding to any realized level of market demand and 
guarantee the market safety by balancing demand and supply at any moment. Therefore, 
in general, firms are better off by employing supply function strategies instead of a fixed 




Klemperer and Meyer (1989) are among the first to study supply function equilibria 
under uncertainty.  They prove the existence of this equilibrium in symmetric setting. 
Moreover, they also show that the equilibrium is closed to the one in Cournot 
competition when the supply functions are very steep, and resembles the one in Bertrand 
competition when the supply functions are very flat. Turnbull (1983), Green and 
Newbery (1992) analyze the asymmetric duopoly firms’ optimal supply functions with 
linear and quadratic marginal costs respectively. They show the linear supply function 
equilibrium is always in the set of solutions.  
 
Our study reveals the strategic incentive for producers to sign forward contract with 
retailers. We find out that the position of the forward contract affects producers’ bidding 
in spot market. Specifically, the more contracts a producer sells in the contract stage, the 
more aggressively the producer bid in the spot market in terms of quantity, and the more 
conservative supply strategies its opponents will apply in the spot market. Therefore, 
producers will voluntarily trade in the contract stage even without the hedging incentive, 
in order to gain strategic advantage in the competition. Most importantly, we show that 
the sale of forward contracts can decrease the market clearing price and mitigate the 
market power in electricity bidding.  
 
Furthermore, out model also includes the influence of capacity constraints. Therefore, 
the study becomes more realistic, compared to the one in the literature of forward 
contracting before. We studies how the forward contracting is affected by producers’ 
capacity constraints, so does the market efficient. First of all, producers with capacity 
constraints sell less forward contract than in the case when they have unlimited 
generation resources. Second, the producers with larger capacities do not sign as many 
forward contracts as producers with smaller ones. As a result, they hold up part of their 
capacities before the small size firm reaches its limitation. Hence, they take advantage of 
their higher generation capability to push up the market clearing price. The intuition is 
easily understood in the duopoly case. The producer with smaller capacity employs such 
equilibrium behaviors, because after it reaches its upper limit of capacity, neither its sale 
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position in forward contract nor its bidding strategy can affect market clearing price. 
Consequently, it commits to higher contract position to get higher market share in the 
competition before it has fully load. For the producer with larger capacity, it loses interest 
in signing forward contracts after the smaller one have to generate with full load, because 
the strategic motivation does not exist. The sale of forward contract lowers the expected 
profit after its optimal supplies equal to its capacity constraints. Therefore, producer with 
larger capacity prefers to commit to as small amount of forward contracts as possible.  
 
Finally, in this paper, we also roughly discuss the impact of the option contract in the 
market. Recently, the option contract seems more and more attractive in electricity 
market because of its flexibility and its ability to hedge quantity risk. However, we show 
that the option contract work not as effective as forward contract to mitigate the market 
power when the spot price is not very high. Since when the spot price is lower than the 
strike price, the retailers have no obligation to buy any product at strike price from 
producer. Hence, the option contract has no impact on producers’ strategy, so does the 
market equilibrium.  
 
The paper contributes to the literature from two aspects. First, the major finding in 
this paper suggest that even without policy obligation of forward contracting, producers 
still have incentive to sign the future/option contracts, which push down the market 
clearing closer to the competitive level, so as to introduce more market competition and 
benefit the social welfare. Second, to our knowledge, this paper is the first one that 
combines producers’ behaviors in both forward sale and spot market bidding with their 
capacity constraints, which makes the model more realistic. We not only propose a 
stylized mathematic framework to solve such complicated equilibrium, but also explain 
the connection between them. It answers the important questions such as how the severe 
capacity constraints hurt the market competition and why larger size producers to abuse 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we analyze producers’ 
strategy if forward contract is allowed and producers have unlimited generation 
recourses. Section 3 presents the influence of the capacity constraints on producers’ 
behaviors. In section 4, the influence of the option contract is studied. Section 5 includes 
the discussion and the limitations of our model. We summarize and conclude in section 6.  
 
2. MODEL WITH NO CAPACITY CONSTRAINT 
2.1  Model Set-up 
Consider N risk-neutral producers, who produce a homogenous perishable good. 
Their production technology is characterized by a cost function as ( )ic q 1,..i N , which 
is the total cost to produce q units of electricity. We assume the cost function is in a 
quadratic form i.e.,   2i i i i i ic q c q d q  . The cost function implies that there is no fixed 
cost, since (0) 0ic  11. Each producer’s cost function is public information shared by all 
producers in the market12. Moreover, each producer has unlimited generation capacity, 
i.e.,    1, 2,...,iq i N   . 
 
The real-time demand is represents by the aggregate demand by all retailers in the 
market, ( , )Q p p    . p represents the price and   characterizes the demand 
elasticity13. The market uncertainty is , which is a random drawn from a distribution 
function, ( )F   with support[ , ]  . We assume that ,     and p are positive 
 
                                                 
11 In electricity production, (0) 0ic   because there are a lot of sunk cost such as warm-up fuel cost. 
12 See Hortacsu and Puller (2005). Their conversation with several market participants in ERCOT suggest 
that traders have good information on rival’s marginal cost because they use similar technology in Texas 
and public data on fuel efficiency on each generation unit is also available. Moreover, some market 
participants also purchase large rival plant’s real-time production data through a company, Genscape. 




Before the real-time demand is realized, producers compete in two stages: contract 
stage and sport market, illustrated in figure 1.  
 
In contract stage, we assume that all producers and their counterpart, retailers, 
simultaneously negotiate for a bilateral contract. producer i signs forward contract with 
retailers, in which producer i promises to deliver ix  units of electricity to retailers after 
the demand is realized. The forward price is if  14. After signing the forward contract, 
retailers have obligation to buy ix  units of electricity no matter what spot price is. If the 
spot market clearing price mcp  is above if , producer i will refund  mc ip f to retailers; 
otherwise, the retail pays  i mcf p  to producer i. After they sign the contract, the 
forward contract quantity, ix , is observable to all producers15. We assume that there is 
perfect arbitrage between the contracting stage and the spot market. Therefore, producers 
will not sign contract for the purpose of exploiting arbitrage profit. 
 
Next, at the real-time spot market, producers involve a uniform price multi-unit 
auction. There is a market maker, whose only objective is to clear the market. The market 
maker does not make any profit through market trading. Producer i provides its supply 
                                                 
14 We restrict the forward contract is the fixed order. Otherwise, the equilibrium analysis will be different. 
15 The observability of the forward contract is a key assumption here. We will discuss this assumption in 
part III. 
Producers simultaneously 
submit supply schedule 
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contract with retailers 
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Market demand is realized and 
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schedule  iq p 1,..i N  to the market maker in the spot exchange market, 
where    ' ''0 and 0 i iq p q p  . The supply schedule,  iq p , specifies the quantities 
producer i provided at any price level. Thus, producers provide the whole supply curve 
instead of a fixed quantity. 
 
In the end of the game, the market maker knows the real-time demand and set the 
market clearing price, mcp to balance the aggregate demand and supply. Each producer 
produces the quantity  i mcq p according to market maker’s order. In this paper, we are 
only interested in pure strategy equilibria of supply functions. 
2.2 Spot Market 
In order to find the equilibrium in spot market, we follow the same procedure as in 
Klemperere and Meyer (1989). In the spot market, producer i’s strategy is a function 
which maps a price into a level of output, :[0, ) ( , )iq     . After real-time market 
demand is realized, market clearing price mcp , is the one to balance demand and supply, 
decided by 
   ( ) ( )i mc mc
i
q p Q p      (2.1),  
and producer i is deployed  ( )i mcq p   units of electricity by market maker.  
 
For every realization of market shock  , producer i’s optimal strategy is to maximize 
its ex-post profit, as its residual demand is the difference between market demand and the 
sum of other producers’ potential supply,  ( ) ( , )i i
j i
RD Q p q p 

  .Therefore, given 
the forward contract positions for all producers, the equilibria consists of a group of 
functions  iq p  such that  iq p maximize i’s expected profits: 
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     max  E *   
1, 2...                                           (2.2)
i j i i i i jp j i j i
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Producer i’s expected profit is equal to revenue in the spot market, minus production 
costs and payment transfer of forward contracts.  
 
Given  jq p , producer i fins its profit-maximizing price along its residual demand 
curve and yield the first order condition 
     ' ' 0j i i j j
j i j i j i
p q p x p c p q p q p    
  
    
             
     
    
(2.3) 
In order to illustrate the characteristics of producer i’s optimal strategy, we can rewrite 
(2.3) as 
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Equation (2.5) can be seen as a makeup expression. The right hand side term of (2.5) 
is similar to the inversed price elasticity of the residual demand curve producer i faces.  
Therefore, the less the elasticity, the more market power producer i has, because the 
markup in price above marginal cost is larger when producer i faces a steeper residual 




   , the residual demand 
curve is perfectly elastic, then the market clearing price is equal to the marginal cost so 




  , the results reverses, which 
most likely occurs in peak time when power demand is very high and power generation 




In spot market, the set of first condition of (2.5) for each producer, when written as a 
system of equations, characterizes equilibrium strategies,  iq p .  However, the 
computation of equilibrium strategies is not a trivial task. Thus, we now continue to 
develop our analysis by restricting the functional form of the supply function to a certain 
kind, in which quantity supply by producers is linear to the price16.  
 
 The linear supply function equilibrium. 
We can show that there exists a group of linear supply schedule satisfies (2.5). 
Let  i i iq p a b p   (2.6),   2i i i i i ic q c q d q   (2.7), with , , 0i i ib c d  . Substituting (2.6) 
and (2.7) into (2.5), we obtains 
(2.8)                    (2.9)
1 2 1 2
i j i j
j i j i
i i
i j i j
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x b d b
a b
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From equation (2.8) and (2.9), we can concludes that 







Lemma 1 shows that, in linear supply function equilibrium, the position of the forward 
contract of a producer only affect the intercept of the supply function, but not the slope. 
Hence, the forward contract position shifts a producers’ supply function parallel to the 
right. It implies that the more forward contract sold by a producer, the more electricity it 
is willing to provide for the same price level. 
 
Moreover, given any market shock and the size of the forward contract, the market 
clearing price is  
                                                 
16 Turnbull (1983), Green and Newbery (1992) show the linear supply function equilibrium is always in 
the set of solutions. 
17 It is easy to show the existence and uniqueness of the solution by substituting (2.6) and (2.7) into (2.4). 
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
   (2.10) 
By doing comparative static analysis, the effect of forward contract on the equilibrium in 
spot market can be characterized in following two propositions.  








Lemma 3. 0 and 0 i i
i j
q q i j
x x
 
   
 
 
First, Lemma 2 proves that the existence of forward contracting can mitigate the market 
power, since each producer’s position of forward contract has negative effect on market 
clearing price. For a given market shock, , producer i faces a residual demand 
curve  ( ) ( , )i i
j i
RD Q p q p 

  , and acts as a monopolist. To maximize its profit, 
producer i choose the price, 1p  at the production level where its marginal revenue and 
marginal cost equals as in Figure 2. Figure 3 illustrates how forward contract affects the 
strategy chosen by a producer. As shown in Figure 3, after producer i signs forward 
contracts, ix , producer i’s residual demand changes to the one in which ix units of product 
should be taken out at every price level. Then the market clearing price becomes 2p , 
which is lower than 1p . 
                                                 





Next, Lemma 3 has very important implication of the strategic interaction among 

















positive effect on its supply in spot market. When a producer promises to supply more 
units of electricity in a forward contract, it commits a higher production level even before 
the bidding occurs. It, hence, will bid more aggressively in terms of quantity in spot 
market. As a result, it pushes down the market clearing price. Moreover, a producer’s 
position of forward contract has negative effect on all other producers supply plans in 
spot market, because other producer expects a lower market clearing price after observing 
a producer’s commitment in contracting part. The strategic effect of forward contract is 
very similar to the effect of forward contract in Cournot competition19. 
 
2.3 Contract stage 
In this stage, all producers choose their positions of forward contracts, 
 1, 2,...,ix i N    to maximize their expected profits, by knowing the strategic effect of 
their forward contract on spot market equilibrium,  
 
Since we have assumed that there is no arbitrage between spot market and contracting 
stage, the hedging incentive for forward contract can be ignored. Thus, the forward 
contract price will equal to the expected market clearing price, i.e. i if E p . The 
rationale is that if i if E p , retailers do not want to sign the contract and delay their 
purchase until spot market opens; however, if i if E p , producers lose money by signing 
forward contract and would like to sell all products through spot market bidding.  
 
Each producer chooses its position of forward contract so as to maximize its expected 
profit, which can be formulated as follows: 
       imax  E ( , , ) ( , ) * ( , , )
. .  
i
i i i i i i i ix
i i
q p x x x p x f x c q p x x f d
s t f E p







                                                 
19 See Willems (2005). 
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After substitute the perfect arbitrage condition, we can see that producer i’s expected 
profit depend indirectly on the sale of forward contract: 
       imax  E ( , , ) ( , ) ( , , )
i
i i i i ix
q p x x p x c q p x x f d

      
    (2.12)  
Let us take the first derivative of (2.12) with respect to producers’ contract sales, the 
first derivative becomes 
        ' '
Part I Part II
j
i i i i i
j ii i









  (2.13) 





  is the effect of producer i’s forward 
contract on all other producers, which is negative according to proposition 2. It is easy to 
show that if a producer’s forward contract has no effect on spot market bidding at all, 
then (2.13) is negative, which follows the proposition 1. Under such circumstance, the 
optimal strategy for producer i is not to commit any position in contract stage. In another 
word, in absence of the strategic effect for forward selling, producers have no incentive to 
sign any contract, given the set-up of the game. In (2.13), part I represents producer i’s 
benefit from forward contract that increases its market share, and part II represents 
producer i’s loss from the contract that decreases the market clearing price. The optimal 
sale of forward contract is the one to balance those two effects. 
 
3. FORWARD CONTRACT WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS 
In the previous section, we derive the supply function equilibrium without 
considering about the capacity constraint. However, in practice, every power provider has 
such constraint, because of the limited capacity of their producers, or the real-time 
availability of the generation resource. Therefore, it is very important to know how the 




To illustrate the effect of capacity contracts, it is very helpful to begin with the 
example of two-producer case ( 1 2 q q ). Moreover, we also assume that producers use 
same production technology, i.e. 2( )ic q cq dq  to simplify the computation.  
 
3.1 Spot market 
Since they cannot bid beyond their capacity constraints, producers’ bidding curves are 
discontinuous. First, when neither producer reaches its capacity limitation, producers’ 
bidding strategies are the same as the ones without taking into account the presence of the 
constraints, which is denoted as  1 1 1  1, 2i i iq p a b p i    20from now on. 
 1 1,  1,2i ia b i  is decided by (2.8) and (2.9) respectively . Second, producer 1’s supply 
schedule will be  21 1q p q  after it reaches its capacity cap. Therefore, the residual curve 
faces by producer 2 is 2 1( , )RD Q p q  . Obviously, the market clearing price is only 
affected by producer 2 after producer 1 use up all the generation resource. Then before 
producer 2 reaches its own upper limit of the capacity, the optimal strategy 
 2 2 22 2 2q p a b p  is chosen to maximize its profit corresponding to each realization of 
market shock  
   1 2 2 2 1max  *i ip p q x p f x c p q            . (3.1) 
Last, after producer 2’s capacity also reaches its upper limit, its bidding strategy 
is  3  1, 2i iq p q i   . 
 
From the equilibrium supply functions, the price,  1, 2ip i  , at which producer i 
reaches its capacity limit can then be obtained. Therefore, when producers’ bidding is 
restricted by the upper limit of their capacities, we have 
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-( )= q qp 

  (3.7) 
 
There are three observations from proposition 3. First, equation (3.4) and (3.5) show 
that the effect of the forward contract is the same as in Lemma 1. Second, after both 
producers reach their capacity caps, their forward contracts have nothing to do with their 
bidding in the next stage. Last, as a consequent, the forward contract does not affect the 
market clearing price when a producer has already used up its generation resource. 
 
3.2 Contracting stage 
In spot market, both producers have kinked supply schedules in the spot market. 
From equation (3.6) and (3.7) in proposition 3, we know that the cutoff points of prices, 
1p and 2p correspond to the realization of the market shock 1  and 2 respectively, where 
 11 1 1 1( )q p q   and  22 2 2 2( )q p q  .  
 
As the same rationale in the case without capacity constraint, the assumption of no 
arbitrage implies that the forward contract price equals to the unbiased estimator of the 
market clearing price in the spot market. Each producer chooses the level of its future 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 :  i=1,2 is the index of the generators; k represents the part of the supply schedule.kiq  
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sale,   1, 2cix i  , so as to maximize his expected profit, which can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
     












max  E ( ), ( ) * ( ), ( )
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3.3 The influence of capacity constraint on forward contract 
Proposition 3 illustrates that producers’ capacity constraints change the shape of their 
bidding curve in spot market. In this section, we focus on the effect of the capacity 
constraint on producers’ position of forward contract in this section.  
      3.3.1  Symmetric case 
First of all, let us consider the case with 1 2 q q q    . Let 
*
unx  and 
*
cx  denote the 
optimal contract when producer with and without capacity constraints respectively. 
Proposition 4 indicates that when a producer’s production has constraint, its sale of 
forward contract is lower, compared to the case in which it has an unlimited level of 
production. 
Proposition 4. un cx x 1, 2i   
It seems very intuitive that producers will decrease their forward commitment and also 
production because they have limited availability of generation resource. We would like 
to further illustrate that producers sells less forward contracts for strategic reasons. 
 
After simplifying (3.8), producer’ expected profit consists two parts. 
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        1
0 1
1 1
1 1 1 2
Part IIPart I
max  E ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ( )c c
x
q p x p c q p x f d qp c q f d
 
 
            
 (3.9) 
Part I of (3.9) is the expected profit when the producer’s capacity constraint is not 
binding, which takes the same form as the one when the producer has no capacity 
constraint. However, part II of (3.9) is the one with binding constraint. It is easy to show 
that the effect of the forward contract on part II is negative. As we mentioned in section 
II, the producers sign forward contracts only because their contracts have strategic effect 
in spot market and they want to get competitive advantage through contracting. If this 
motivation disappears, the producers will lose money by selling forward contract. After a 
producer achieves its upper limit of production, neither its position of forward contract 
nor its bidding strategy affects market clearing price and has strategic effect on the 
producer’s behavior.  As a result, in order to lower the loss after its capacity limitation is 
achieved, a producer has to decrease its forward contract sale.  
 
3.4.2 Asymmetric case 
In this section, we assume that 1 2q q The next proposition shows the difference in 
optimal contract choices because of producers’ asymmetric capacity constraints.  
 
Proposition 5. If 1 2q q , then 2 1
c cx x . 
Proposition 5 shows that producers with larger capacity choose smaller size of forward 
contract.  In order to prove, we compare the optimal contract choices by producers in the 
case 1 2q q q   and 1 2q q q   and find out that their decisions in contract sale is 
2 1
c c cx x x  .  For producer 2, we can divide its expected profit into three parts: 
        
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                         (3.10)
 
In part II and part III of (3.10), producer 2 is not reaching its limitation yet, while 
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producer 1 produces at highest level it can. From producer 2’s perspective, it knows that 
producer 1 will achieve its upper limit first. After that, producer 2 will be a price setter if 
producer 1 alone cannot cover the market demand, since producer 1’s bidding just 
parallel shift the residual demand curve faced by producer 2 in the market and cannot 
affect the market clearing price. Producer 2 behaves as a monopolist in the market. 
Compared to symmetric case  1 2 q q q   , producer 2 has even less incentive to 
forward contracts.  As producer 2 backs off its position in forward contract sale, producer 
1 is better off by selling a little bit more forward contracts than in the symmetric case, so 
that the market clearing price does not change and producer 1 gets more market share 
when it has not reach its capacity limit.  
 
3.4.3 Market with N>2 producers 
Until this point, we show that the market equilibrium when there are only two 
producers. If there are more than two producers in the market, the analysis is similar as in 
two-producer case. We assume that each producer has capacity constraint  i=1,2,...,Niq  , 
where <  when i jq q i j .  
 
In the spot market, there are N>2  cut-off points  i=1,2,...,Nip   which 
correspondents the capacity constraints  i=1,2,...,Niq  . Up to ith cut-off point ip  , where 
the ith producer reaches its upper limit of capacity, its bidding schedule is derived as the 
same way as there is no capacity constraint. After ip , the supply schedules of ith producer 
and producers who has smaller capacity are iq , and consequently, only -N i producers in 
the market affect the market clearing price. The optimal sale of forward contract is 
decided the same as in two-producer case, but with more parts because there are N>2  
cut-off points . Although we will not go through the details here, we expect that influence 
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of the capacity constraint and market equilibrium is very similar to the ones described in 
proposition 4 and 5 in the previous sections21.  
 
4. THE EFFECT OF CALL OPTION CONTRACT ON SPOT MARKET 
In US electricity market, option contract is not used as much as forward contract, 
because of its complexity and relatively higher cost. However, this kind of forward 
contract calls more and more interest because it has advantage in hedging quantity risk. 
Since electricity is very expensive to stored, the important issue in risk management is to 
hedge quantity risk.  
 
After signing the forward contract, producers and retailers are obliged to have 
payment transfer on a fixed level of power, no matter what the real-tine demand is. For 
instance, consider the case when market demand is very low so that it is very possible 
that the market clearing price is lower than the contract one. The retailers who sign the 
contract will pay producer the difference between the spot and contract prices even when 
they need not as much power as specified in the contract.  
 
However, in option contract, the quantity of power delivered from producers to 
retailers depends on the realization of spot price. Specifically, the quantity delivered 
increases in spot price. In this section, we assume that only financial call option is 
allowed22.  At contracting stage, producers can sell call option contract, ix  to retailers at 
price ik , where strike price is  is determined exogenously. If spot price is higher than strike 
price, then producers return ip s  to retailer. Otherwise, there is no transfer payment 
between them. Therefore, the option contract is one-side insurance for retailers to against 
price rising above strike price, and it is more efficient to hedge quantity risk. The 
payment of the option is written as: 
                                                 
21 Authors will provide other simulation results by request. 




 ( ) max ,0i iv p p s     (4.1)  
Now, we would like to see how the option contract selling affects producers behavior 
and market equilibrium. In the spot market, producers still provide their supply schedules 
without knowledge of the realization of .  
 
Giving the position of call option, producers choose their supply functions to 
maximize their profit corresponding to each realization of market shock as it behaves 
with forward contract: 
      ( ) *i i mc mc i i mc i i i mcpMax q p p k v p x c q p      (4.2) 
When ip s , it is easy to show that (4.2) is the same as the one in the model of forward 
contract. When ip s , producers’ behavior is independent of the optional contract. 
Hence, the call option affects the producers’ behavior only if the spot price is above the 
strike price. Proposition 6 describes the spot market equilibrium with call option contract. 
 
Proposition 6: With call option contract, when ip s , the optimal linear supply function 
is defined as 1 1  1,2,...,i i iq p i N     , where  1 1,i i  equals  ,i ia b defined by 
equation (2.8) and (2.9) respectively.  When ip s , the optimal linear supply function 
is 2 2  1, 2,...,i i iq p i N     , where  
























Proposition 6 shows that in the spot market, if the market clearing price is above strike 
price, the bidding strategies for producers are the same as if they sign the forward 
contracts. The option contract will have the same impact on market equilibrium as 




described in proposition 1 and 2. However, when the spot price is lower, the producers 
act like with no contract at all. The conclusions above imply that the option contract can 
mitigate the market power only when the market clearing price rises beyond the strike 
price. from this point of view, forward contracts are more efficient than option contract. 
 
5. DISCUSSION   
3.1 Observation of the forward contract  
In this paper, a key assumption is that producers can observe the forward contract 
position before spot market opens. Hughes and Kao (1997) discuss the impact of the 
observability of forward contract. Their model is similar to Allaz (1992) in which spot 
market stages are Cournot competition. They find that the strategic incentive disappears 
for risk-neutral producers if forward positions are unobservable. In fact, each producer 
strictly prefers not to engage in forward contracting.  Here, we expect that the conclusion 
remains the same as in Hughes and Kao (1997) if the contract is not observable.  
 
In most of the US electricity markets, they do not have the mechanism to reveal 
contract information to all generators in real time. However, they do provide historical 
information several periods after real-time trading23. Moreover, Hortacsu and Puller 
(2005) propose a method to estimate producers forward contract position. Therefore, the 
producers can have at least consistent predictors for forward contract either from 
historical statistics or the estimator from empirical model. The importance of observation 
of forward contract remains to market designers’ consideration about the information 
releasing issue in market restruction design in the future. 
 
3.1 The forward contract exchange 
In this paper, we focus on the producers who produce and sell a particular perishable 
good, electricity power. Instead of modeling each individual retailer’s demand, we 
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simplify the demand side by aggregating the total demand from all retailers. Now, we can 
have a further look on how each individual retailer behaves in the exchange market, 
given its forward contract in T=1.  
 
We assume there are K retailers. In the real-time, the retailers’ obligation is to meet 
their customer’s demand with very low price elasticity. Hence, the retailers have low 
ability to grab the market power, compared to the producers. Therefore, we assume that 
the retailers are price taker in the market. For retailer k, its real-time demand denotes as 














  . kd  may higher or lower 
than its contract units, ky . Hence, in the equilibrium the retailer k’s net payment is 
   k mc k k mc kR p d y E p y    
kR  consists of two parts.  mc kE p y  is retailer k’s contract payment.  mc k kp d y is net 
payment in the exchange market. It is positive when retailer k has shortage in real-time 
with its contract quantity, or is negative when retailer k’s buys too many contract in 
contracting stage. From this point of view, the spot exchange market serves as a market-
place where retailers exchange their forward contract in real-time to balance their 
inventory. In another word, the retailers with extra products  i.e. k ky d  sell their 
contracts to the retailers with shortage  i.e. k ky d  by market clearing price mcp . The 
market mechanism is equivalent to a spot forward contract market, which is an efficient 
vehicle of inventory management for agents with extremely perishable products. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
We studied the essential relationship between producers’ forward contract and the 
bidding strategies in spot market. Our model reveals the strategic incentive for producers 
to join in forward contract market voluntarily. It shows the presence of forward contract 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 In Texas, ERCOT publishes all the market information, including each generator’s bidding schedule, 
market clearing price and forward contract six months after the operating day. 
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can make producers produce more aggressively than without it. Therefore, the sale of 
forward contract serves as an effective mechanism to mitigate market power. Moreover, 
although the option contract is better in hedging quantity risk than forward contract, the 
latter work more efficient to deter the abusing of market power when spot price is not 
very high. Although market designs may vary, our model addresses a general theoretical 
framework to explain producers’ behaviors in the electricity market.  The paper is 




Chapter 3. Credit-default swap and B2B Exchange Market liquidity 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper proposes a contract-theoretical framework, which integrates two risk 
management mechanism, the spot market exchange and credit-default swap, into firm’s 
portfolio, when they have demand uncertainties and face a not fully-liquid market..  
 
In an exchange market with limited number of firms, there are two kinds of 
liquidity risks. The first one is a focus in previous risk management and finance literature, 
which is how easy firms can trade in the exchange market, when the realization of 
uncertainty turns out to be different for each firm. The market liquidity can be measured 
by the degree that market clearing price is affect by a single firm’s supply or demand 
(O’Hara 1995; Kyle 1989). 
  
The second risk is the market failure, which can be considered as an extreme case 
of market illiquidity. In Lin, Fang and Whinston (2006), they show that even firms with 
idiosyncratic shocks, the market failure could happen. There is always a chance that the 
realization of all firms’ uncertainty turns out to be the same, i.e. all generators 
simultaneously face the very high power demand in summer in Texas electricity market. 
As a result, the exchange market can no longer be a vehicle to help firms hedge their 
risks, and the aggregate risks appear as a “macro”-like shock. It is significantly possible 
when the market has limited number of firms. However, the literature to deal with 
idiosyncratic risk management often ignores the potential damages caused by this kind of 
market failure, and chooses to trespass it. Some traditional economic or financial 
researches, like Persaud (2003), study the market failure by simply assuming a perfectly 
correlated risk faced by all firms in ex-post market. Others assume that there are 
sufficient numbers of firms with idiosyncratic risk, so that they can apply the law of large 
numbers to diminish the possibility that ex-post risk appears to be positively correlated. 




However, this kind of market failure is not trivia, especially when firms rely too 
much on the exchange market to hedge their operational risk. Firms could run into 
serious liquidation problem because the exchange market is the only hedge platform for 
them so that firms become vulnerable to this macro-like shock. Moreover, the possibility 
of such market failure could be large especially when we deviate from the conventional 
assumption of fat tail distribution of demand risk and consider extreme events as 
ancillaries (Taleb 2001).  Therefore, firms should realize the potential danger of market 
failure in the risk management decision, even when firms’ risks are independent. 
 
Lin, Fang and Whinston (2006) have showed that the exchange market liquidity 
determines how effectively a B2B exchange market serves as a platform to hedge 
idiosyncratic operational risk. They argue that the exchange market is fully liquid only 
with a sufficient number of market participants, so that firms can reduce their operational 
risks to the largest extent and be the least restricted by their capital structures. However, 
with only limited number of firms, the market lacks fully liquidity, which causes strategic 
interaction among firms and strengthens the effect of their capital structures on their 
production decisions.  
 
In this paper, we illustrate, how a particular financial instrument, credit-default 
swap, to help firms to temporarily transfer default risks caused by the demand uncertainty 
and market illiquidity risk to outside investors. In particularly, the financial instrument is 
a contract between firms and outside investors, in which firms deliver a certain amount of 
fee to investors in exchange of an insurance offered by investors when firms cannot pay 
back their loans. As a result, firms can decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy by 
purchasing such credit derivative. We have a three-period model. In the first period, firms 
decide how much to invest in production and the optimal amount of credit derivative 
purchased from a competitive credit-default swap market. In the second period, firms’ 
local demand is realized. Meanwhile, the spot exchange market opens, in which firms 
with extra products can trade with firms with shortage under a market clearing price. 
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Finally, if firms have enough profit to cover loan payment, it earns a positive profit in last 
period; otherwise, they either bankrupt if they did not sign credit-default swap contract, 
or they get insurance from investors according to the contract signed.  
The credit-default swaps are currently used more and more frequently in banking 
systems, but still a new phenomenon in firms’ operational risk management. We will 
illustrate in more details about the current credit-default swaps market in section 2. This 
paper proposes this stylized mechanism, which is mostly used in banking system, for 
firms to share the part of the default risk, which cannot be hedged by the spot exchange 
market.  To our knowledge, it is the first one to study the effect of credit-default swap in 
the firms’ risk management. There several major findings in our paper. First, firms 
purchase the credit-default swap only when the default is costly. The decision of whether 
to join the credit-default market is the tradeoff between the bankruptcy cost and the 
payment for purchasing the credit derivative, if investors in the credit-default swap 
market are competitive and risk neutral. Secondly, the price for the credit-default swap 
decreases in the liquidity of the spot exchange market, since firms’ default risk decrease. 
Thirdly, the information availability plays a very important role in credit-swap market. 
Specifically, when the firms and outsider investors have the exactly same information, 
then every firm is better off by purchasing the credit-default swap. However, if the firms 
have private information, “lemon” problem occurs in the credit-default swap market. 
Under certain condition, firms with lower possibility to default have higher incentive to 
purchase the credit derivative than the ones with higher possibility to default. Hence, 
there is potential social cost caused by the costly early default.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the features 
of the credit-default swap and reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the models 
with and without the credit-default swap market. Section 4 extends the model to consider 
the correlated interest rate and some other risk-management mechanism. The final section 
concludes and summarizes.  
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2. CREDIT-CREDIT SWAP 
In financial market, the credit-default swap is an over-the-counter financial contract with 
payoff contingents on the certain kind credit default condition.  International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association has begun to produce standard document in the trading in credit 
default in 1991. Although the credit derivatives market remains quite small currently, it 
grows very rapidly24.   
The Credit Default Swap (CDS) is “a bilateral financial contract in which one 
counterparty (the Protection Buyer) pays a periodic fee, typically expressed in basis 
points per annum, paid on the notional amount, in return for a contingent payment by the 
protection seller following a credit event with respect to a reference entity,” where a 
credit event is the relevant condition, negotiated between counterparties at the inception 
of the transaction to trigger the contingent payment.25 
 
In practice, the credit-default swap is most used by banks to hedge their credit 
risks, when they provide loan to borrowers. Several studies (see, for example, Pennacchi 
(1995)) argue that banks are willing to involve in loan sales or credit derivative because 
of their desire to economize on their regulatory capital. In order to hedge loss caused by 
the borrower’s default, banks sells credit risk (or buy credit protection) to outsiders who 
receive periodic payment from banks. This is similar as insurance purchase: one party is 
selling insurance and the other counterparty is buying insurance against the default of the 
third party. 
 
However, in our paper, our focus is not bank’s risk management. Instead, we 
study how firms can use credit-default swap to hedge their liquidity risk. Hence, firms 
purchase the credit-default swap from outside investors directly. The incentive for them 
to make the purchase is to avoid direct or indirect bankruptcy cost.  In our model, the 
bankruptcy cost is that firms will loss opportunity to earn positive expected profit in the 
future. Among different kinds of credit-default swaps, the credit-default swaps falls into 
                                                 
24See Spraos (2001) 
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the category of a binary credit default swap, in which the payment in the event of a 
default is a specific dollar amount.26 Like in most literature, we assume that default 
probability and interest rates are independent. 27  
 
The credit-default swap is an emergent financial assistant only when firms are 
short of cash.  With no-arbitrage argument, the cost of the credit derivative is equal to the 
expected payment of financial assistant from outsiders (Hull, J. and White, A., 2000). 
This logic suggests that the valuation of the credit derivative critically depends on the 
default probability of firms. A related literature examines the effect of information 
asymmetric of the default probability between outsiders and firms on the value of credit 
derivatives. Duffee and Zhou (2001) show for banks which purchase the credit derivative, 
the value of the credit-default swap in the adverse selection is different from the one in 
the moral hazard problem. In the adverse selection problem, the quality of loan is entirely 
exogenously determined. Therefore, the introduction of the credit derivative market is 
socially costly. However, the credit derivative market is beneficial to offset the moral 
hazard problem when the quality of loan is endogenously selected by banks themselves.  
 
3. BENCHMARK MODEL: WITHOUT CREDIT-DEFAULT SWAP MARKET 
3.1 Model Set-Up 
Before we study the effect of credit derivative purchase, let us examine the benchmark 
case, in which there is no credit-default swap market available for firms. Consider N 
identical firms that are monopolies in their local markets, and each has internal asset A. 
They operate in three periods (0, 1, and 2), which is represented in figure 1.  
                                                                                                                                                 
25 “The J.P. Morgan guide to credit derivatives”, with contributions from the RiskMetrics Group, 
published by Risk, 2002 
26 Some other kinds of credit-default swap often used in risk management are basket credit default swap, 
contingent credit default swap, dynamic credit default swap etc. The definition of those credit derivative 
can be seen in Hull, J. and White, A., 2000  




In period 0, firms need to invest I, in a new technology in order to produce a 
homogenous, short-lived good (denoted by y) in the following two periods. We assume 
that I A . Therefore, firms have to borrow I-A from financial institutes, such as banks, 
or finance by issuing stocks. Although the capital structure is an important part of firms 
risk management, it is not our focus here. Therefore, we do not explicitly model firms’ 
capital structure here. Instead, we assume that if firms’ profit is less than B in period 1 
and 2, then they default. There is no depreciation in the model. 
 
In period 1, the new technology incurs production shock: firms obtain either R 
units of products with probability x, or zero with probability 1-x. Meanwhile, firms’ local 
market demand, iQ   1,2, ,i I N   , is also either R or zero. The probability that demand 
is R for firm i is i , which is an independent random variable drawn from a uniform 
distribution, ( )U   with support ,1   . The local market demand realizes in period 1, and 
firms sell products at a uniform price, P 28. The local market demand is primarily served, 
and firms can trade products in a spot exchange market after that29. The more detail 
discussion on this market remains in the next section. 
 
We denote firm i’s expected revenue in period 1 is 1iV  For simplicity, we assume 
that if firms do not default in period 1, firms can expect revenue 2iV in period 2.  2iV  is 
independent of the profit earned in the first period, and the number of firms remains in 
                                                 
28 This can be considered as contract price. 
29 The firms can be regulated to satisfy their local demand, as power companies in US.  
Firms observe the real demand 
and output, and enter the 
exchange market if necessary 
Firms make 
investment  
If firms do not default 
in time 1, then they 
earn profit V2 
Figure 1: Timeline 
Time 0           Time 1                  Time 2  
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period 2.  Next, we also assume that the investment has positive present value, 
i.e., 2( ) 2x PR V B   . Hence, firms have incentive to invest at period 0. 
 
3.2 The spot exchange market 
In period 1, firms’ demand and their production levels are realized respectively. There are 
four possible situations that firms face, which are summarized in Table 1. In case 1 and 4, 
firms demand and production match while firms have shortage in case 2 and excess 
product in case 3.  
 
Table 1. The Cases after Demand Realization 
 Demand and production Probability 
Case 1 ,  yi iQ R R   i x  
Case 2 ,  y 0i iQ R    1 i x  
Case 3 0,  yi iQ R    1i x   
Case 4 0,  y 0i iQ      1 1i x   
 
The spot exchange market opens at period 1. Assume there is no cost to enter the 
exchange market. Hence, all firms who fall in either case 2 or case 3 are willing to join in 
the spot exchange market. The market rule is that each firm simultaneously submits its 
trade plan without knowing other firms local demand and production, and the market-
clearing price, w, is determined by the intersection of total supply and demand in the 















       








   | , 0i ii i Q R y      (3.1) 
The rationale is that since firm i can sell product at price P in its local market, it 
wants to buy as much as possible when the price is lower than P, and it is indifferent 
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between buying and not buying, when the market-clearing price is P, the firm. The firm 
will stop buying when the price rises above P.  
 
Following the similar logic, the supply correspondence for firms with excess 
products is 

















   | 0,j jj j Q y R      (3.2) 
The firm is willing to sell at any positive price because it has already paid the cost 
of production in period 0. The firm is indifferent toward selling when the market-clearing 
price is zero. Denote the number of firms who have extra products as m. The market-
clearing price, w, is defined as          
 
             if   
0,        if   
0              if   
P m N m





     (3.3) 
The equation above shows that the market clearing price is zero when the total 
units of extra products are more than the total shortage, and it is P when there is more 
shortage. When the units of shortage and excess products are the same, the market 
clearing can takes any value between zero and P with equal possibility, since neither 
seller or buyer has bargaining power. Hence, the expected market clearing price in this 
case is 2
P .  
As a result, firm i’s revenue, 1iV , in period 1, is contingent on the real-time 




     with 
1   with 
2











     (3.4) 
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where  1, 2,3kit k   denotes the probability of three different realizations of the 
profits in period 1. Without loss any generosity, we assume 1
2
B PR , so that firm i’s 
expected profit, i , takes form: 
   1 3 2(1 ) 2i i i iV t V B         (3.5) 
















Lemma 1 shows that firm i’s default probability is decreasing in the probability of high 
output, and its expected profit is increasing in it. Since firms have the same technology 
shock and share common information for other firms’ local demand risk, only each firm’s 
knowledge of its own local demand risk affects the expected probabilities of default and 
the expected profit differs.  As firms’ expected profit monotonically increases in i , the 
proability of high output can represent the type of the firms. In the remaining part of the 
paper, if  i j i j    , then we say firm i is with higher type, compared to firm j. 
 
Lemma 2. 3it  decreases as N increases. 
As more firms involves, the trading volume in the market increases, so does the market 
liquidity.  It gets easier for firms to find trading partners in the market. Therefore, firms 
have less risk to default. Moreover, we also have 
Lemma 3. The expected revenue, iV , increases as N increases. 
Therefore, as market liquidity increases, the spot exchange market works more efficient 
as risk sharing mechanism. 
                                                                                            
However, if with limited N, firm i has still a certain probability of default at 
period 1.  This default causes a social loss, because the profit has positive NPV.  
Therefore, the function that the exchange market improves firms’ profit and increases 
social efficiency is limited. There are two possible circumstances under which firms 
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cannot transfer their risk through the spot exchange market. First, since the market is not 
fully liquid, the realization of the market clearing price may not benefit the firms who 
join in the exchange. Second, the market may fail, i.e. market clearing price does not 
exists. For example, when all the firms have zero product and high local market demand, 
no one sells and market clearing price goes to infinity. As a result, the exchange market 
alone is not enough for firms to fully hedge firms’ default risk. They need extra risk 
sharing mechanism, especially when the spot exchange market with very volatile price or 
with high possible of market failure. Hence, we propose a stylized “insurance” market in 
the following section. 
 
4. WITH CREDIT-DEFAULT SWAP MARKET 
4.1. Credit-default swap market. 
 
We assume that a credit-default swap market is available for firms in period 0. In 
this market, firms can purchase a credit derivative from competitive risk-neutral 
outsiders. Like the standard credit-default swap contract used by banks, the credit 
derivative provides compensation for firms in the end of period 1 if firms’ expected profit 
in period 1, 1V , is less than B . Otherwise, the instrument pays nothing.  Since we 
Firms observe the real demand 




If firms do not default 
in time 1, then they 
earn profit V2 
Figure 2: Timeline 











PR B , firms default only when its revenue in period 1 is zero. Therefore, when 
firms sign contract with outsiders, they will request that the compensation from the 
derivative equals to B  in order to avoid early default. Firms buy credit-default swap from 
outsiders with price  iT B . For the competitive outsiders, their profits from the credit 
market are breakeven, because of the no-arbitrage argument. Therefore, the zero-profit 
condition for competitive outsiders implies that the price is 
3i iT t B   (4.1) 
 
Lemma 4. iT  decreases as N increases.  
The proof of the lemma 4 follows lemma 2 directly. From outsiders’ points of view, since 
firms have lower probability of bankruptcy as market liquidity increases, the outsiders 
expect less chance to provide the compensation for firms. From firms’ side, when the 
market liquidity increases, firms have less incentive to buy the insurance because the 
chance of early default becomes less. Hence, the price charged by the competitive 
outsiders drops. 
 
From equation (4.1), we know that outsiders’ belief of probability of default is critical in 
pricing credit-default swap. Therefore, information availability to outsiders plays a very 
important role in this market. In the next two sections, we will discuss about how 
different information structures affect the credit-derivative pricing and the firms’ decision 
to enter the credit-default swap market.  
 
4.2. Symmetric information 
In this section, we assume that each firm knows its own type, i , but not others. 
Moreover, they can truthfully reveal their types to outsiders when they purchase the 
derivative. Hence, the price for firm i to buy credit derivative from outsider can be 
written as  
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    3 ,i i iT YL t x B    (4.2) 
Then, firm i’s expected profit, if it buys derivative, is 
  1 2| 0i i iE V T V B V B       (4.3)  
By comparing the expected profit with and without buying derivatives, we have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1. When outsider knows the true value of i , the price for credit-default swap 
is    3 ,i i iT YL t x B , 1, 2...,i N  . Firm  1, 2...,i i N   is better off by buying 
derivative, if 2 2iV B . Moreover, firm i’s decision of buying derivative is independent of 
i . 
 
Proposition 1 implies that firms will join in credit-default swap market if the 
expected revenue in the period 2, 2iV , is high enough. We notice that this condition set a 
very strict requirement for firms. It rules out the firms with negative present value 
project. Moreover, it has even higher requirement such that only firms whose second 
period revenue can cover all the financial cost, will buy the “insurance”. In fact, this 
condition becomes redundant if firms incur a big enough deadweight loss (For example: 
bankruptcy cost) when it defaults. Let us denote iL  as this loss. We can show that even in 
one-period model, firms would like to buy credit derivatives. Their expected profits 
without buying credit derivatives is 
  1 3 3| 0 (1 )i i i i iE T V t B t L       (4.4) 
However, its expected profit if it buys the credit derivative is 
  1| 0iE T V B     (4.5) 
Hence, firms choose T>0, if the deadweight loss is higher than B (i.e., iL B ), even in 
one-shot game.  Therefore, in our model, the second period expected profit, 2V B , is 
equivalent to the bankruptcy cost here. In summery, firms have incentive to purchase the 




However, since the payment for the credit derivative varies with firms’ types, 
whether firms can credibly reveal their types to outsiders is crucial.  Suppose that firm i 
with type i  tells outsider that its type is
'
i , which is higher than i . From equation (4.1), 
it is easy to show that    'i i i iT T  . By lying about its true type, firm i costs less for 
the same level of insurance from the credit derivative.  However, outsiders are worse-off 
because their expected profit is negative. As a result, if outsiders have no way to audit 
firms’ types, they cannot believe the types revealed by firms, and the equilibrium above 
does not exist.  
 
4.3. Asymmetric information 
In this section, let us exam the case in which we relax the restriction of credible type 
revelation. A firm normally has more accurate information on its own type than others. 
Hence, we assume that firm i  1,2...,i N  knows its true type, but other firms and 
outside investors in the market have no more information on firm i’s type, other than the 
prior distribution. Moreover, firm i has no mechanism to reveal its true type to outsiders. 
Last, when outsiders decide whether to sell credit derivative to firm i, they cannot know 
how many other firms simultaneously pursue the credit derivative in the market30. This 
assumption is actually not very arbitrary. In the credit-default swap market, there are 
many outside investors. Different firms can purchase credit-default swap with different 
outsiders. Hence, one outsider may not know how many firms pursue “insurance” from 
another outsider in the market. 
 
Firm i’s information set (denoted as i ) is 
  , ,i i i jE x j i        (4.6) 
Outsiders have a prior belief that   ,o o iE x i    . However, when a firm asks for 
“insurance”, outsiders can update their belief on that particular firm. The intuition is as 
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follows. Suppose that outsiders keep their prior belief on firms’ types no matter whether 
they ask for “insurance”. Therefore, the price of the credit derivative is the same for all 
firms, which is 
 3 ( )   i iT t x B t x B i    (4.7) 
Now, we have a firm i, whose probability of high demand is i x  . From lemma 1, we 
know that      3 3 ,i i it x t x t x  .  Hence, firm i’s payment for the “insurance” is higher 
than the one it pays when it can truthfully reveal its type. Without buying any credit 
derivative, firm i’s expected profit is 
       1 3 3 3 2| 0 1 , 1 ,i i i i i i i iE T V t x B t x V          (4.8) 
Meanwhile, firm j’s expected profit when it purchases the credit derivative is 
 
     1 3 2| 0 ,i i i i i iE T V B t x B t x B V        (4.9) 
Hence, firm i will purchase the credit derivative only if  
   3 2,i i it x V t x B    (4.10) 
According to lemma 1, the right hand side of the inequality above decreases in i . 
Therefore, it is expected that for the firms with high i , may not satisfy (4.10) and would 
not buy credit derivative. Therefore, we can present outsider is updated as 
       3 2| ,   0,   ,o i i i i i jt x V t x B if T and E x j i         , (4.11) 
and the payment for the credit derivative is  
    3 0| ,    i i i jT t x j i B        . (4.12) 
 
According to the argument above, we can describe the equilibrium in which how firms 
behave in the credit-default swap market in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. There is a̂ : 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 If outsiders can use the number of firms which enter the credit-default swap to update their information 
set, the market equilibrium will be very complicated. 
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(1) If ˆ 1  , there is a pooling equilibrium such that all firms buy the credit 
derivatives from outsiders with price   ,  i iT E x i   . 
(2) If ˆ 1   , there is a separating equilibrium such that only firms with 
ˆ  i i     buys the credit derivative from outsiders with 
price    
ˆ
   
2i i j




   
 
; firms with ˆ  i i   , will not enter the 
credit-default swap market.  
 
As in proposition 2, either a pooling or separating equilibrium is possible, depending on 
the model’s parameters.  In the pooling equilibrium, all firms buy credit derivative and no 
bankruptcy occurs in the first period. However, in the separating equilibrium, not all 
firms are willing to pay for this derivative. The reason is that there are two forces to 
lower the interest of high-type firms to purchase credit-derivative. The first force is that 
they worry less about early default since they have lower possibility to default no matter 
in symmetric or asymmetric cases. However, the second force is more important here. 
When firms cannot reveal their true demand uncertainties to outsiders, they buy the credit 
derivative with uniform price. Hence, it is too costly for them to buy the derivative, 
comparing to the case when outsiders know their true type.   
 
4.4. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
In the symmetric information case, if we assume that the expected profit in the second 
period is big enough, i.e. 2 2V B , firms are always better off if they buy the credit 
derivative, because it provides insurance to avoid costly default. Hence, all firms in our 
model join in the credit-default market. The price charged by outsiders varies from one 
firm to the other, based on their default probability and no firm defaults in the end of 
period 1.  Therefore, in the symmetric information case, the economy reaches the first 




In the asymmetric case, however, we can summarize the welfare analysis in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3. There is no social cost in the asymmetric case, if ˆ 1  ; the welfare reduce, 
if ˆ 1  . 
Proposition 3 illustrates that whether asymmetric information causes the welfare 
reduction depends on the parameters. On one hand, when ˆ 1  , all firms buy the 
insurance so that there is no costly early default. Compared with the symmetric 
information case, there is only one change in the economy with asymmetric information, 
which is the amount of “insurance” payment for firms. Hence, an individual firm’s profit 
or a credit buyer’s net plus may change. However, it is easy to show that the change of 
the payment transfer between firms and the credit-default buyers does not altar aggregate 
social surplus. On the other hand, when ˆ 1  , the firms with their type ˆi   will not 
purchase the insurance, and they have  it  probability to default. Hence, the aggregate 







 , because of costly default from firms 
with ˆi  . 
 
Furthermore, the effect of the number of firms on social welfare is ambiguous. 
Proposition 4: ̂  decreases as N increases 
Proposition 4 shows that as more firms involves, the range in which firm buy credit 
derivatives shrinks. More and more firms find out that it is not worth of purchasing 
“insurance” if their payment for the “insurance” do not depend on their own types. 
However, as we shown in Lemma 1, with more firms involved, the spot exchange market 
becomes more efficient and liquid. Hence, the default risk is lower.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
1. Use loan sale to hedge risk 
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In this paper, we show that credit-default swap market can help firms to avoid their costly 
default and increase their expected profits. We have mentioned before, this idea is 
motivated by that banks used this market to hedge their loan credit risk.  In fact, there are 
many other mechanisms banks usually use to hedge credit risk. A most traditional way is 
through loan sale. In order to minimize their credit risks, banks can sell a certain fraction 
of the cash stream from a specific loan to outside investors so that they can guarantee 
certain level of return on the part of the loan sold.  In our model, we can show that if 
firms can issue one-period loan sale, it can replicate the credit-default swap to hedge 
firms’ default risk. For example, suppose firm i sells a fraction, if  of loan to competitive 
outsiders in period 0. The buyers receive a fraction of if  of any cash flows from the loan 
in the end of period 1. We assume that firms can make committee to sell the factions as 
assumed in Gorton and Pennachi (1995). Moreover, we also assume there is no arbitrage 
as in the credit-default market model. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the price for this loan 
sale firm i asks for (denoted as iL ) satisfies 
1i i iL f V  (5.1) 
In order to avoid early default, the sale price of the loan sale must be at least equal to B. 
Hence, from equation (5.1), we can conclude that 
Lemma 5. With symmetric information between firms and outsiders, firms with 










 of loan to outsiders with price B. 
 
Following the same logic as in the credit-default swap, we can derive an equilibrium 
which is similar as described in proposition 2 when the firms have more accurate 
information than outsiders. However, we leave the illustration to readers’ own interest 
and will not dig into more details. 
 
Although loan sale can replicate, at least to some extend, the function of credit-default 
swap to lower firms’ early default risk, there are several obvious advantages for using 
credit-default swap. First of all, Duffee and Zhou (2001) illustrate that credit-default 
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swap is more flexible to circumvent the “lemons” problem than loan sales. As long as the 
information asymmetric varies over the life of the loan, credit-default swap works more 
efficient to transfer the risks than long-term loan sale. They point out that although, a 
sequence of one-period loans can replace the function of credit derivatives, they cannot 
replicate credit derivatives perfectly in a broad sense, because of some well-known 
reasons such as liquidity risks (Diamond,1991) or tax-timing issues.  
 
Secondly, firms prefer to hedge their liquidity risk via credit-swap because it has 
significant advantage in tax and accounting issues.  Credit-swap purchase allows firms to 
reduce risk without physically removing assets from their balance sheet, so that it does 
not lead a sale for either tax or accounting purposes. Therefore, it does not affect any risk 
management decision-making. In banking system, Credit Swaps have been employed 
more and more in risk-hedge to avoid unintended adverse tax or accounting consequences 
of otherwise sound risk management decisions. (JP Morgan) 
 
2. Correlated Interest rate  
In our model, we assume that the firms are obligated to a fixed financial cost, B, which is 
not affected by firms’ activity in both the spot exchange market and the credit-default 
swap market. This assumption follows a convention in the literature about the credit-
default swap. Although this is not critical in this paper, but deserves some further 
illustration. In reality, bank usually offers lower interest rate to high quality lenders than 
to low quality lenders. In our model, we have proved that firms decrease their early-
default risks by purchasing credit-default swap. Therefore, they can ask for lower interest 
rate because their investment is more “secure”, compare to the firms without “insurance”.  
However, there is normally no monotonic relationship between interest rate and quality 
of the investment in banks operation. Duffee and Zhou (2001) explain that the bank’s 
profit merely depends only on that project. Instead, it may correlate with some other part 
of bank’s activity. An important factor to decide the interest rate a bank can charge is the 
bank’s market power in lending to firms. If it is not easy to switch bank, firms have to 
accept the high interest rate even for high-quality of investment. Moreover, Stiglitz and 
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Weiss (1981) show that the asymmetric information problem between banks and 
borrowers contaminate the creditable quality revealing. Therefore, banks may use 
uniform interest rate for both high and low quality loan. This is essentially related to our 
model, since how firms can make firms believe that they will buy the credit-default swap 
after they borrowing the money is a big question. 
 
6. CONCLUSION REMARKS 
The demand shock and technology shock may lead the unmatched local market demand 
and excess supply. As a result, firms face early default, since its revenue cannot cover the 
contracted financial cost. This risk is essential big for firms who produce perishable 
goods because of the special characteristics of perishable goods. In Lin, Fang and 
Whinston (2006), they propose a spot exchange market as a risk sharing mechanism 
where firms with unmatched demand can trade with firms with shortage.  However, 
whether the market has enough liquidity determines how efficient this spot exchange 
market works for risk-hedging.   It is well accepted that market liquidity is a big problem 
in most of market. Moreover, whether this market exists is another question. Even if 
firms have idiosyncratic risk, it has a chance that the realizations of those random factors 
become the same for all firms, which is similar to “macro”-like shock. Under this 
circumstance, all firms either have extra product or have shortage so that the market 
exchange cannot occur.  
 
Therefore, we provide a stylized method for firms to improve their risk management. We 
build in a role for credit-default swap in firm’s risk management portfolio. As a result, 
firms can get compensation from outside investors when they are exposed to financial 
distress. In exchange, they agree to pay a certain fee for this “insurance”. We show that 
the credit-default swap contract is affected by information structure in the model. When 
the information is symmetric between firms and outsiders, all firms are willing to 
purchase this credit derivative and their prices vary with their expected default 
probability. However, when firms have superior information to outside investors, outsider 
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investors can only charge a uniform price. As a result, for the group of firms who have 
lower possibility to default, it is too costly for them to purchase the credit derivative and 
not join the market.  “Lemons” problem leads to social cost, i.e., costly early default. 
 
This paper provides a theoretical basis of introducing new instrument in firms’ risk 
management. We do not claim this is the only way to deal with firm’s default risk. 
However, compared to some other instrument, such as loan sale, it has some obvious 
advantage in firms’ overall management, and it has been proved more flexible to deal 
with “lemons” problem.  
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Appendix A: The Proofs for Chapter 1  
 Proof for Lemma 1 
Proof:  Firm i’s profit function is ( ; , , ) min{ , }i i i i i i iq P c Q Q q P cq B     
Case 1: If 
cP
Bq ii 
 , then ( ; , , ) min{ , }i i i i i i iq P c Q Q q P cq B    <0 




 Case 2.1. When ii Qq  , then ( ; , , ) 0i i i i i iq P c Q q P cq B       
 Case 2.2. When ii Qq  , then ( ; , , ) 0i i i i i iq P c Q Q P cq B     only if  
     ˆi iQ Q  i i
cq B
P
                                      QED. 
 
 Proof of proposition 1 
Proof:  Since 1iBF
P c
    
,   0f x   and  ' 0f x   for all ,iBx
P c
    
 and 





 31 is non-decreasing as x  , then the first order condition (FOC) at iB
P c
 is 
( ) 1 0i ii
B BFOC q P c F
P c P c
                 
 








    
 
, it is easy to show that 
( ) 0iFOC q    from below
  
Secondly, if we can show that second order condition (SOC) only change signs once (from 
negative to positive), we obtain uniqueness. The second order condition (SOC) is  





i i i i
i
cq Bf
c c PSOC q Pf q f q Pf q
P P f q
  






It is easy to show that
2 2
0i iB BP cSOC f
P c P P c
            



























   .  




 , given any x and  
 
f x
f x  
























     . Therefore, the second order 
condition only changes signs once, and hence the optimal solution uniquely exists. 
 
 Proof for proposition 2 
The impact of debt on production is 
 










By using implicit function theorem, we can show that this effect is positive. QED. 
 
 Proof for Lemma 2 
Proof: Without limited liability, the firm’s objection function of the firm is 






E q P Qf Q dQ P q f Q dQ cq


    iB  1,...,i N    
The first order condition is  
 1 iP F q c     
The first order condition in the case of limited liability is 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 It represents the rate of decreasing likelihood.  
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    ˆ1 i iP F q c cF Q         
Thus NO NLq q , because that  ˆicF Q  is strictly positive. 
 Proof for proposition 3:  




























11      
For each firm, the cutoff points of bankruptcy is  
( ) ˆ( ) i ii i i i i i i
B c w qPQ w q Q cq B Q Q
P w
 
      

 
Then firms maximize their profit by choosing iq  
Case 1: When w c , the firms is not bankrupt, when  





. The first order condition is  
ˆ




Bw c q f Q dQ q
w c

   
  





. The first order condition is 
0
 ( ) ( ) 0 FLi i iw c q f Q dQ q

     
 
Comparing among case 1.1 and 1.2, the last one has the highest profit. The firms can produce 
infinite products when w c . Therefore, this is not equilibrium because no firm will buy from the 
market. 
Case 2: When w c , we know that ˆ 0iiQ  . The first order condition is 
ˆ




w c q f Q dQ q

     
The firms’ optimal production is 0, when w c . Therefore, this is not equilibrium because no 
firm can sell in the market. 
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Case 3: when w c , we know that ˆ 0iQ  . The first order condition is 
*
ˆ ˆ
 ( ) ( )  0* ( ) 0 [0, ]
i i
i i i i i iQ Q
w c q f Q dQ f Q dQ q
 
        
Therefore, the equilibrium market price is w c . Furthermore, in order to have a full liquidity 
market, the equilibrium production level should satisfy 
1 ( )FL FLi i
i i
nq Q q Q Q E Q
n
      . QED. 
 
 Proof for Lemma 3 
The expected market clearing price (denoted as WE
ji QQ ,
) is 































 the expected profit is  




; , ( ) ( )
i i
j i j j
i i
P c q Bq q q Q
cq Bi j i i i i i i j j
P





   
 
     











; , ( ) ( ) ( )
                        +( ) 1 ( )
i i
j i j j
i i
j i
P c q Bq q q Q
cq Bi j i i i i i i j j
P
q q
i i i i j j j j
G q q B PQ B cq f Q dQ f Q Q






   
 
       
 





ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j i j i
j i j i i j j
i
q q q q Q
i j i j j i i j j i iq q Q q q Q
F Q
Q Q F Q f Q dQ f Q dQ f Q dQ F Q F Q
 
   

      













BcqQqq      
As we proved before, if the firms’ profit can cover the debt cost, the realization of the demand is 











 ˆ   QED. 
 
 Proof for proposition 4 (see figure below) 











P c q B




cq B cq BFOC e P P q P c ce

   
  
    
 






Condition of existing and uniqueness of optimal solution:  
(i) It seems almost always if P is not too large and Bi is not too small, we have  
     
2
21( ) 2 0
2
iB
P ci i i
i
B B BFOC P P c P ce




            
 
(ii) It is easy to show that there exists a B , when iB B , E  always increases much faster 
than D , when debt is large enough. 
Since the first order condition satisfies the above conditions, it can be equal to zero at most once. 





 Proof for Lemma 6 






max ; , ( ) ( )
                                             1 (1 ) ( )
j i j i j ji i
j i ji j
i
j i i j i j
q q q q Q QQ Q
i j i i i i i jq q QB Pq
q
P c
q q q q Q Q
i i
G q q B PQ e dQ Pq e dQ e dQ





     
       
    
    
  
  
 i icq B  
 
The first order condition is 
   2( ) 2 2 1( ) 1 ( ) 0
2
i jq q
i j i j i i jPe q q q q q q q c
               
 (*) 
We can prove that the objective function is concave. Let NLEXq be the optimal solution here.  
Consider equation (5.6), 
     
22 ˆ( ) 2 2
( ) ( )
1 2ˆ ˆ( ) 1 ( ) 1 0
2 2
i ji j i
q qq q Q
i j i j i i j i i
I I I
P cPe q q q q q q q c e Q Q c e
P
   

                           
EXq  is optimal solution in (5.6). Since the second part of (5.6) is positive, therefore, if we 









Appendix B: The Proofs for Chapter 2 
 Proof of Lemma 2: 
Proof:  mc mc i mc i
i i i i i
p p a p b
x a x b x
    
 
    
 























 Proof of Lemma 3:  
Proof: for any market clearing price, the quantity is deployed for producer i is  
 
   + *    
1 2 1 2
i i i
i j i j i
j i j i i
ii j i j
ij i j i
q a b p
x b d b a







    
 
     








j ii i i i i
i i






q a a a aPb b







     
     





   
 
 Proof for Proof 3:  
 For  
1
11 2
1 1 1 21
2





   

 
o The symmetric equilibrium supply schedule   1 11 2( ), ( )q p q p is decided by (4) 
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 For 1 22 1 2 1 2
-( ) , where =  is decided by   q qp p p p q q p  


      













o The supply schedule for firm 1 is  21 1 q p q   
o The supply schedule for firm 2 is decided by 
   1 2 2 2 1max  *i ip p q x p f x c p q             (9) 
The first-order condition is 
      '2 22 2 0i iq p x p c q p          (10) 
Substitute  2 2 22 2 2q p a b p  , we can have 


















 For 2 p p , The supply schedule for firm i is  3 i iq p q   





 Proof of proposition 4 
1. At T=2 
 For ˆ ˆ  where  is decided by  q ap p p q a bp
b

    , the symmetric equilibrium 
supply schedule   1 1 11 2( ) ( ) ( )q p q p q p  is decided by (4) 











 For  2ˆ ,  p p q p q   





2. At T=1 
 The cutoff for  , which maps p̂  
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        
 For firm i, x  is decided by 
     





max  E ( ), ( ) * ( ), ( )
                + ( ) * ( )
.   ( )
x
q p x x p f x c q p x f d
q x p f x c q f d





     
  
















( , ) ( , )( ( , ) 2 ( , ) )
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q x p xp x cq p x d q f d
x x
qp c q f qp c q f
x x
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 
    
 
  
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 One observation is  R   is increasing in   
 
     
0
( , )( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) 2 ( , ) )   
1 1 2
i i
i i i i i i
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i
a p xp x p xLet R b p x c q p x d q
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  












Since R  increasing in , and ( ) 0 (derived from the first order condition),
ˆthen R 0. As a result, the second order condition<0
f















 Since ( )R  is increase in , then if we substitute *unx  in the first order condition above, 
the first order condition is negative. Therefore, *unx is higher than
*
cx , which is the optimal 
contracts units with capacity constraint. 
 
 Proof of Proposition 5 
 The cutoff for  , which maps 1 2ˆ ˆ,p p  
o 










     
 










     is decided by  22 2 2ˆ ( )q p q   
 For firm 1, 1x  is decided by 
     
    






1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1ˆ
1 1 3 1 1 1 1ˆ
1
max  E ( ), ( ) * ( ), ( )
                + ( ) * ( )
                + ( ) * ( )
.   ( )
x
q p x x p f x c q p x f d
q x p f x c q f d
q x p f x c q f d







     
  
  








The first order condition 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 11 1
ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 1
1ˆ 1 11
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , ) ( , )( ( , ) 2 ( , ) )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 0
( , ) ( , )( ( , ) 2 ( , ) )
q x p xG p x c q p x d q
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q p p c q p f q p c q f
x x












      
          
  




       1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0q p q p f
x
       
 
 
If we substitute *cx , which is the optimal forward contract in symmetric case, then we have 
1 1
1 2a a  and
1 1
1 2b b . Therefore, 1ˆ ˆ  . As a result, the first order condition  
 
      

     
0
ˆ* 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
1
00 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0iG x R f d q p q p fx


     
 

      
 
 For firm 2, 2x  is decided by 
     
     







2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2ˆ
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The first order condition 
                
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If we substitute *cx , which is the optimal forward contract in symmetric case, then the first 
order condition becomes 
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             

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Appendix C: The Proofs for Chapter 3   
 Probabilities Used in The Proofs 
 Probability of enter by a firm other than firm i 
Pr (      ) 2 (1 )ob firm j is in the market x x   
 
 There are K out of N firms with extra demand or surplus 
     1k-1N-1
Pr (         |       )
=C 2 1 1 2 1
k N k
ob k out of N firms in the exchange market firm i is in the market





 Give K firms in the market and firm i is in the market too, the firms net 
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 The probability for the realization of revenue for firm i based on firm i’s 
information 
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 The probability for the realization of revenue for firm i based on outsider’s 
information 
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 The Proof for Lemma 1 
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 The Proof for Lemma 2 
        
        
        













1Pr ( = 0 | ) 1 Pr ( = PR | ) Pr ( = | )
2
1 1 C 2 1 1 2 1
1 C 2 1 1 2 1
1 C 2 1 1 2 1
1 C 2 1 1 2 1
i i i
N k N k
i i
k
N k N k
i
k





t ob i ob i ob PR i
x x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x













   
      
    
    





          
          














1 1 C 2 1 1 2 1
1 C 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 C 2 1 1 2 1 1
N k
k
N k N k
i i
k








x x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x x x

   
  









       
     




    
   
   
      
     















1w e can  show  that 1   is  odd  and    is even
2










t N t N
x x
r
Kr r k r
N











       
       
  


































     
  
            






   
       











1We can prove that C 1 0
3 K-1 3For C r 1-r -α k -r ,we can take out -α 5 , then
4 N 4














       
  
     
     
     
         
   


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We can continue to take out the coefficient for the term for k is odd until 1  
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 The Proof for Lemma 3 
The proof for Lemma 3 follows the prove in Lemma 3. 
 
 Proposition 1 
      Proof follows directly by comparing equation (4.3) to equation (3.5). 
 
 Proposition 2.  
 
Assume there exists a cut-off point,̂ , such that firm i does not buy derivative if  ˆi  . 
Then the outsider’s belief of local market risk for the firms ask for credit-default swap is  







   
     and probability of default is  
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Thus, the firm with local demand risk,̂ , is indifference between buying credit- default  swap 
and not buying, i.e. 
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 The Proof for Proposition 3 
When firms can truthfully reveal their type, the social net surplus is 
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when ˆ 1  , then the social net surplus is 
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Compare 0W and  ˆ 1W   , there is no social net surplus. 
When ˆ 1  , then the social net surplus is  
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Compare 0W and  ˆ 1W   , the social net surplus decreases 















 The Proof for Proposition 4 
Proof:  ̂  is increasing in 
 
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. We can show that as N increases, h increases as showed in 
Lemma 2. Moreover, ̂  rises as h gets bigger. Therefore ̂ decreases as N increases. QED. 
 
 The Proof for Lemma 6 
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